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Editorial

EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF SPUTNIK

THIS issue goes to press on the eve of the first Canadian Conference on Education, called to examine the purposes and results of our educational system. While it cannot be said that this conference represents a panic reaction to Russian missile superiority, for it was conceived months before Sputnik revealed this threat, yet it is held at a time when many are convinced that our most urgent problem is to surpass this scientific achievement. Much attention is being given to a comparison of Russian education with our own, and increasing demands are being made that our schools be mobilized to equip our best minds with the skills necessary to regain technological supremacy through a vastly increased emphasis on natural science.

Such demands make imperative a re-examination of educational objectives. Before we are committed to securing the educational means of winning technological superiority, we must consider carefully the conditions of achieving such a goal; for there is evidence to suggest that Western civilization cannot afford to meet them. In the first place, the myth that science and technology will always thrive better in free states than in totalitarian states has been shattered. It now appears that strictly mathematical sciences may well flourish in totalitarian states because within the sphere of these disciplines the scientist may be allowed freedom to be creative. As a citizen he may have no more liberty than anyone else; but mathematics is independent of value judgments and is the one sphere of intellectual activity where a significant measure of freedom may be enjoyed. If, in the second place, the scientist happens to believe in the philosophy of dialectical materialism, he will agree that the chief end of man is to produce. Having cast off the Christian "superstition" that to gain the world is to risk losing the soul, he will be able to devote himself to the race for technological superiority with a singleness of purpose that cannot so easily be enlisted in the West. These factors, together with Russia's ability to control her educational system so entirely as to make it a forcing house for the production of scientists and engineers, give her an outstanding advantage in an all-out technological race.

The price of successful competition against such odds might well be so complete a reorientation of our educational system as to put in jeopardy the most cherished values of our civilization. Though our way of life has become highly materialistic, it remains true that this is a perversion of our Christian heritage rather than a true expression of it, and that this heritage still provides the norm of our basic cultural values and social goals. If these fundamental goals and values are to remain operative in any significant

degree, our educational system must be one which is concerned to cultivate wisdom above scientific and technical competence. By wisdom is meant all that is involved in spiritual maturity and greatness. The ability to reach the moon, however impressive, is insufficient evidence of a nation's greatness. Only the cultivation of the gifts of the human spirit in an atmosphere of freedom will make possible the continuance of a great civilization. Without minimizing her technical achievements, it is fair to say that Revolutionary Russia has not made the positive contribution to the higher development of the human race that characterizes all great nations. This is not due to any inherent lack of talent among Russian people. Pre-revolutionary Russia had, in addition to outstanding scientists, great writers, poets, dramatists, composers, social philosophers. Dostoievsky, Tolstoy, Turgenev, Chekov, Gogol, Moussorgsky, Tchaikovsky—these and others have put the world forever in their debt. Revolutionary Russia has failed to reproduce their kind, and today the literary, musical and philosophical output of the West is vastly superior. Is this not due at least in part to the fact that in our educational system the liberal arts and humanities are valued both for their own sake and as an index of our social and spiritual health? For the arts and humanities invariably reflect the existing social and spiritual condition, and the Russian state does not allow its artists freedom to be creative because it fears such a critique.

Freedom has been accorded the scientist, for without it there could be no science. But a culture which concentrates on science at the expense of the arts and humanities can never be great, and can never provide satisfactory answers to the deepest problems of man. Aristotle provided an important educational principle when he observed that while high achievement is possible to the precocious child in mathematics, a significant contribution in philosophy depends on maturity of insight and experience. This suggests that an educational system that is predominantly scientific offers no assurance of developing the wisdom and insight which are the prerequisites of a mature civilization. It has been said that a dramatist or poet who lives after Newton is in no way better equipped than was Shakespeare to confront us with the truth about our human predicament. So with Sputnik: this latest device has not changed the basic character of the human problem, but only accented it. This is a problem which concerns the whole man, and it cannot be solved by a development, however extensive, of those capacities for abstraction which may be found in a precocious child. What is required is the wisdom of maturity, based on the experience of the race, which the humanities alone make available to each succeeding generation. To subordinate the liberal arts and humanities in order to turn our universities into factories for the mass production of technicians would amount to a betrayal of our heritage so complete as to signify that the battle had already been lost to Marxism. And at any rate, when man puts his faith in the guided missile—whether it be Russian or American man—this must surely be the ultimate blasphemy.

This is not to say that science and technology should be neglected, for they belong peculiarly to the civilization that has been shaped by Christianity. But within the context of the civilization which gave it birth, science has been interpreted as primarily a search for truth; to make it subservient to the demands of a race for power amounts to a prostitution of its true purpose. Sputnik has made it clearer than ever that scientific achievement is a major risk apart from intellectual, moral and spiritual control. As Dorothy Thompson has said, "Any society exclusively dominated by science will be a slavery for everyone except scientists." This is our fate if we yield to the hysterical demands of those who would make our educational system subordinate to the production of scientists *en masse*. We need science more than ever to be true to its own calling; but more than ever we need more than science. Many scientists have themselves been asking us to be morally concerned about the *ends* of science and the uses to which it is put. Scientists are not automata but men, and the education which they and we receive needs primarily to be an education in the meaning of life—an education which only the humanities, informed by theology, can provide.

C.D.J.

Christians and Time

J. S. WHALE

WE assume that time is real and no illusion. This is the obvious meaning of our clocks and calendars, our diaries and anniversaries. But what is time? We cannot say. Our attempts at definition break down because they always include some temporal reference. That is, they make use of the very thing to be defined: which is like explaining a liquid as something wet, or a flame as combustion. Any mystery which is resolved in terms of itself must remain a mystery. It was the profound and subtle mind of St. Augustine which gave classic expression to this difficulty when he wrote: "If anyone asks me what time is, I cannot say; if no one asks me, I know very well." How, then, do Christians understand time?

I

Let us approach the problem, not by way of our Hebraic-Christian heritage as set forth in the Bible, but by way of that other heritage which is also ours, the Hellenism of the ancient world into which Christianity came. It is beyond controversy that theology has often stood thus in the court of the Gentiles. One of the declarations which Christian thought has frequently made about time and the meaning of history has its source, strictly speaking, in Athens rather than in Jerusalem. It has never completely forgotten what it learned from its "ancient Platonick nurse," namely that men are aware of time because they belong to eternity. Our very consciousness of temporal succession and change is possible because

> our destiny, our being's heart and home
> is with infinitude and only there.

Like the animals we are creatures of time and sense; but, unlike them, we know it. It is because we thus transcend time, that we do what ape or ant or intelligent sheep-dog can not do: we look before and after; we carry the tragic knowledge of our temporality; we wear watches and hang up calendars. In the very act of calling ourselves mortal we presuppose the immortal and the eternal. The absolute is already implied in the relative. Our finiteness has meaning only in correlation with infinity. Indeed, Tillich has argued that man alone possesses genuine finiteness because he alone is able to look beyond it. "Thou hast made us for Thyself and our heart is restless until it finds rest in Thee." It is St. Augustine's Christian Platonist way of saying that the things which are seen are temporal because the things which are not seen are eternal.

But is Christian *Platonism* a possible combination? Our stricter biblicists say no, but no one may deny that this type of philosophical theology has

influenced Christian thought from the beginning. Though it comes from Hellas rather than from Mount Zion, it may not be repudiated as altogether alien. Despite certain Barthians, there is a true sense in which Plato also is among the prophets; and Tillich would surely add Parmenides. And yet, these philosophical intuitions, belonging as they do to the genius of Hellenism, are not Hebraic and not truly biblical. They are but dubiously Christian. We are as yet only in the outer court of the Temple. It is not a bad place to be in, and at certain notable epochs of its history, Christian Theology has been prone to linger here. The Christian Platonists of Alexandria; the neo-Platonism which passed into the blood-stream of the Church as Catholic mysticism; the Franciscans of the earlier scholastic era; Nicholas of Cusa; the Renaissance Platonism of the Florentine academy; John Colet; the Cambridge Platonists; and, to cut short a list which, if full, would be quite unmanageable, modern platonizing theologians as diverse as Dean Inge, Paul Elmer More and Professor A. E. Taylor. This continuous tradition illustrates Whitehead's dictum that European thought is a series of footnotes to Plato. The immediate relevance of this tradition is its reluctance to allow that time is man's ultimate concern. Time is but the moving image of eternity, a copy or shadow—no more—of the Real which is laid up in heaven. Because the eternal alone is the real, the wise man—as Stoicism put it—is not concerned with time.

How important, then, is history? This is the crucial issue. For the Aryan tradition of Hellenism and philosophical Hinduism, history does not ultimately matter; it does not affect eternity in any way. Seen in the dimension of the eternal, it is a momentary ripple on the ocean of absolute being. Time, at best, is only a second best. In Lessing's famous sentence, "Accidental truths of history can never establish necessary truths of reason." Admittedly, the hold of this transcendental idealism upon the Western mind has been much weakened during recent decades, but it is still powerful. A contemporary philosopher, John Macmurray, has even called it the most serious disease of contemporary spirituality.

II

But now let us leave the outer court and enter the Temple itself. Here the Hebrew prophets are speaking. Israel's understanding of history is dominated by the insight of men who are neither philosophers nor mystics, properly speaking. For them, time is no shadow or copy of the eternally real, but the context and very condition of God's speech to man and of man's response thereto. Time is sacramental in the sense that it is the vehicle of the eternal God's activity; the means whereby He discloses Himself as holy and expresses His will as law; the roaring loom on which His mighty acts of judgment and redemption are woven. Because time is the form through which will necessarily expresses itself, Israel's history (and ultimately all history) gives actuality to the eternal purpose of the living God.

The prophets understand time, then, in terms of will; the purposive will

of God and the responsive will of man. Indeed, certain events in Israel's history make continuously actual a relationship between God and man so close and intimate that it is constantly understood and explicitly described as a covenant-relationship. This is no mere contract, arbitrarily terminable; it is as inherently indissoluble as is the relationship between a son and his father. To the philosophical-Greek mind such a relationship between the infinite and the finite is unintelligible foolishness: to Israel it is the supreme issue, the final meaning and the ultimate glory of human existence. History matters, therefore. Here in the Temple, the wise man, God's servant the prophet, *is* concerned with time. Time is the vehicle, not only of God's dynamic self-disclosure, but also of man's effective response thereto. Time is God's time and He is sovereign lord of it. And so the concern which pervades the prophetic understanding of history is a moral concern; knowing the truth means doing the truth. The inescapeable content of time is decision and action.

Time without content, empty time, is inconceivable. If nothing "happened" time would be not empty but non-existent. Without events of will and act to give it content, time would have no conceivable form. Hence the scriptural insistence (Deut. 30:11f.) that man may do but two things with time: he may misuse it, or use it to God's glory, "redeeming the time"; that is, making the most of every opportunity which it presents. What he cannot do is to live in a neutral dimension of timelessness, where there would be no acts of will, and therefore no effective vindication of the divine purpose.

Throughout the Christian centuries great moralists, our latter-day prophets, have been prone to linger here in the Temple, witnessing to the "categorical imperative," to duty as the "stern daughter of the voice of God"; that is, to the moral urgency implicit in this Hebraic understanding of time. It was one of the greatest Puritans, Richard Baxter of Kidderminster, who lamented that he had "these forty years been sensible of the sin of wasted time." Puritanism's restrictive virtues were sometimes unlovely, but they were a heroic attempt to live "as ever in the great taskmaster's eye." And the great Victorians—to name only Mill and Carlyle, Matthew Arnold and Martineau—had the same high sense of life as a swift and solemn trust. "A man," wrote Carlyle, "cannot make a pair of shoes rightly unless he do it in a devout manner. All work properly so called is an appeal from the seen to the unseen, a devout calling upon higher powers; and unless they stand by us it will not be a work, but a quackery." This moral consciousness of Western man has been nurtured on Israel's prophetic awareness that time is no mere clockwork sequence of neutral moments, but the ordinance of God for the fulfilment of His purpose in creation.

But who can meet this unconditional divine demand, of which time is the symbol? No one. The sublime moralism which braces man for heights of victorious achievement, also mirrors his abiding predicament as guilty sinner and reduces him to despair. The much-quoted question of the prophet Micah (6:8) is in fact a devastating word of judgment. Man is not only judged

and doomed, but also mocked, if this threefold divine imperative is God's only way of dealing with him. He cannot (empirically speaking) redeem the time, making the most of every opportunity for justice, mercy and humility which offers. "Not the labours of my hands can fulfil Thy law's demands." Here is the dilemma of all ethical religion, that the higher the conception of God's holiness the more impassable is the gulf between man and his only source of salvation. Unless there is in the Temple a gospel of God's grace in forgiveness, vindicating yet transcending the judgment of His holy law, who can escape the final condemnation? "I wept much," records the seer, "because no man was able" (Rev. 5:3–4).

And, *a fortiori* no nation is able; not even Israel, consciously called though she is to stand in a specially vital relationship to God and, through the very particularity of this vocation, to be the sacramental nation, symbolizing and mediating the final truth about God's righteousness to all humanity. It is to the elect nation herself that the prophetic word of penal judgment comes (Amos 3:2).

Does God add nothing, then, to the word of judgment and doom uttered through His servants the prophets? Is there no pattern of grace, forgiveness and renewal in their understanding of Israel's history and of universal history, anticipating that gospel which evoked Luther's ecstatic cry of gratitude, "He has another word" (*Er hat noch ein Wort*)? To this question St. Augustine gave the succinct and classic answer that in the Old Testament the New is latent, and in the New the Old is patent. Here the great doctor of grace, writing as biblical theologian rather than as Christian Platonist, was vindicating not only the unity of the scriptures but also their evangelical genius. For essential to the prophetic interpretation of history is what has been called its "two-beat rhythm": that is, the holiness of God *both* visiting her iniquities upon Israel in judgment and disaster, *and* renewing her life in mercy and redemption. As the distinguished French Calvinist Auguste Lecerf once observed to me, "The key to the Old Testament is *tamen*" (i.e. the "nevertheless" explicit or implicit in passages such as Ps. 31:22, 66:11–12, 73:23, 89:33, 106:8, 44; Ezek. 16:60, 20:17; Nahum 9:31; Isa. 54:7–8, 10–13). This is the two-beat rhythm which throbs in the prophetic books. God confronts Israel with forgiveness through judgment, gospel through law, love through wrath, renewal even through destruction and death. His proper work (*opus proprium*) is ever to have mercy and forgive; yet it is made effective through His strange work (*opus alienum*). It was Isa. 28:21, of which Luther made notable use in this connection.

This very polarity is a call for man's response in penitence, gratitude and the new life of faith. But, plainly, it is inconclusive. Heartening to sinful men though God's "nevertheless" is, the disheartening question remains: will human history always be incomplete; will it never reach its purposed goal with humanity's full and consistent response to the holy will of God? The ding-dong struggle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness on the battlefield of every human heart throughout historic time—"there's no

end to it," as we say in moods of frustration and gloom. But ought there not someday to be a triumphant, final vindication of God's redeeming righteousness, when history will reach a climax or goal, and the purpose of God will be conclusively exhibited, and God's last word spoken: when the two-beat rhythm will be finally resolved into "one chord of music like the sound of a great Amen?"

This faith, implicit in prophecy from the beginning, that the purposed divine pattern will finally be completed, becomes explicit in the later form of prophecy called apocalypse. Here Israel's understanding of history becomes dominated by eschatology; that is, a doctrine affirming an end which will be the conclusive manifestation and achievement of God's purpose in history.

In principle, apocalypse adds nothing new to prophecy. It is a vivid, dramatic, and sometimes extravagantly precise statement of the prophetic view of history. Its relation to prophecy is not unlike the relation of "cinerama" to the flat screen, where no different kinematic principles are involved, but where we are made vividly aware of a third dimension. Like the prophets, the writers of the apocalypses realize that every truth about God is eschatological; that is, it necessarily concerns the climax and "end" of history. Because God is lord of history, its ultimate issue must express His purpose. As J. A. T. Robinson has put it with a neatly ambiguous use of the adverb, "What is ultimately real must be ultimately realized"; he adds that whereas for the Aryan tradition of Hellenism and Hinduism the essential is what is true timelessly, for the Hebraic-Christian tradition the essential is what holds true at the end of time. In the Bible, therefore, goal and end, *telos* and *finis*, are equated. It is the end of history rather than a timeless eternity beyond history which expresses the complete and perfect will of God. Therefore, to see in history the hand of the Eternal is to see there the mark of the *eschaton*. Every event which reveals and mediates the judging redeeming will of God in history, prefigures that final consummation of all history which is that "consolation of Israel" for which the Jews still wait: the Messiah is still to come: they are still in the Temple.

III

For the full scriptural and Christian understanding of time the gospel takes us further; from the Temple into the Holy Place itself. For here we are on our knees in thanksgiving and adoration before One who is not only eternal Reality; not only the holy law of righteousness which judges and renews; but God's presence and His very self in a human life and death, manifesting perfectly, representatively and conclusively that complete obedience to the will of God which is the goal and end of humanity in time (Gal. 4:4). Here we are primarily concerned, not with the moral efforts of the will; but with final revelation in the person and work, the passion and victory of the God-Man. Here we are on our knees, because here is One, the only One, who is able (cf. Rev. 5:4–7) to enter within the veil and to stand for ever as our High Priest. We come here and kneel here only in Him.

In Him deity calls saying, "Come unto Me"; and in Him humanity answers saying, "Lo I come . . . to do Thy will, O God." For the biblical understanding of time, what is ultimately real must be finally realized. Jesus the Christ is that final, conclusive realization. Here *is* the kingdom of God. Here the "end" of history has come upon men because He has finished the vicarious, representative work given to Him to do (John 19:30).

In short, the conviction which is the very basis and *raison d'être* of the New Testament is that the Messiah has come; that God has indeed visited and redeemed His people in the action and passion of this "Man,"—whose Work is the *ratio cognoscendi* of His Person, and whose Person is the *ratio essendi* of His Work; that the purposed end of history has here been disclosed with power and great glory; that the Christ is Jesus. This, presumably, is the meaning of Dodd's striking sentence: "That beyond which nothing can happen has already happened." And as it was axiomatic for Israel that the era of the Spirit would have come when this happened, it is not surprising that Spirit is the inclusive atmosphere of New Testament thought. The Acts of the Apostles is a book dominated by the fact of the Spirit, and of the signs which accompany, manifest and interpret its creative activity. The church, the new community of the Spirit, is indubitable proof of the presence of the Age to Come, the era of the Messiah. This presence of the Spirit in power authenticates the gospel of the new age, since it is the constitutive sign of the new age. Christians are people who are already tasting of its powers.

Nearly thirty years ago, when I was learning the history of Christian doctrine at Oxford by the time-honoured method of teaching it, I received much kindness from the Master of University College, Sir Michael Sadler. And I well remember the animation of his handsome features as he greeted me one afternoon, early in the Michaelmas term, and began to tell me of a recent, unique experience. He had come from Switzerland. Voice and eye betrayed his emotion as he spoke of a remarkable man there to whom he had been listening the previous week. "His name was Barth . . . Karl Barth, I think it was . . . You see, . . . he made me feel that tomorrow had already happened."

Sir Michael Sadler was not a theologian, and we may assume that he had not so much as heard of "realized eschatology" in 1929. But through the preaching of the Word, the Spirit had newly convinced him of that finality of God's deed in Christ, which is the purposed end of all history. Barth's preaching had made him freshly aware that this unambiguously historical figure, crucified under Pontius Pilate, is the eschatological figure: that in Christ all time, past and future, discloses its final, divine meaning.

But is this realized eschatology convincing? It is difficult for modern man even to imagine the thrilling hopes aroused when Jesus came into Galilee declaring that the promises were being fulfilled, the decisive hour was even then striking, the end was already happening, and that God was even then acting, with decisive finality, to redeem the world. "He made me feel that tomorrow had already happened." It was the self-authenticating experience

of the Spirit which made men feel it. At Pentecost, fifty days after Easter, it became abundantly convincing. Admittedly, the fourth gospel represents the other tradition according to which the gift of the Spirit is the immediate sequel and effective sign of the Resurrection. Divergent traditions, apparently, linked the Spirit's outpouring with Easter and Pentecost respectively. But is there any significant divergence? Both traditions attest the one reality which matters, namely that the Spirit—*the* effective sign of the new creation —is the risen Lord at work in the imperishable community of His Body. As St. Paul put it explicitly in one place, "the Lord is the Spirit." Through the Spirit at Pentecost this became convincing; and in the fourth gospel the Spirit is called Paraclete, a word which certainly meant "convincer" rather than "comforter," even though the dominant New Testament meaning may be "advocate." The New Testament is saying that He, the Lord, the Spirit, makes us feel that the end has already been disclosed, with power and great glory.

Difficulties remain, however. The end thus realized is, in another sense, not yet realized. We still sin and suffer; we still have to die. Satan has fallen as lightning from the court of heaven, but he still goeth about as a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour. We see Jesus crowned with glory and honour, but *not yet* are all things put under him. There was precisely this same duality or antimony in the experience of the first Christians, even though they knew that they were already living in the new age. This paradoxical duality is characteristic of the New Testament as a whole; its emphasis is constantly twofold; the great gifts of God to which it bears witness are both present possessions and objects of hope. Just as St. Paul speaks of our justification by faith as a present reality and a future event (see Gal. 2:17, 5:5; Rom. 3:13), so the eschatology of the New Testament as a whole is both "realized" and "futurist" in its emphasis. That end which is already here is not yet. Christ's advent is thus twofold; a *geminus adventus*. The risen Christ is that which also shall be; the *'arrabōn*, the "earnest" or sample, "which guarantees that the main consignment will be of the same kind and quality" (C. H. Dodd). In modern Greek the word means "engagement ring"; that is, the proleptic realization of that which is nevertheless "not yet."

In cynical mood we may feel provoked to dismiss this as a perverse appeal for ambiguity; a cool attempt to have it both ways; present, yet future; here, yet not here; yes, and yet no. But here is something which has played too big and enduring a rôle throughout three thousand years of our religious history to be so dismissed. It has been called the telescoping of time. It has been called the sense of contemporaneity; that is, the sense of the contemporaneous oneness of past, present and future in every "now" which is taken seriously. Anyone who knows anything about sacramental religion knows that to be confronted by the saving act of God in all its intrinsic uniqueness, is to be taken out of all temporal limitations.

The research of modern anthropology into the ways in which so-called primitive peoples think is here instructive. Their mentality being synthetic

rather than analytical, they think in terms of relatedness; for them perceived phenomena participate in some sort of whole; their thought grasps a totality. And this awareness of totality informs their sense of time and its passage. This may not be patronizingly dismissed as pre-logical and primitive: it recalls profound Semitic ways of thinking and of awareness. Indeed, every believing Jew understood this wholeness of time supremely during the eating of the Passover meal. There, present and past tenses were indistinguishable. He was truly an Israelite only as he appropriated to himself those great moments in the history of Israel which disclosed the mighty acts of God. Because the exodus from Egypt was Israel's exodus, he was there; he took this commingling of past and present tenses (as western man might express it) with realistic seriousness. He was there too, at Sinai for the giving of the sacred Torah; indeed, his daily meditative study of the Torah was what it is now fashionable to call "existential"; that is, it was truly effective only as he could say, "This day I myself have received this holy law from Sinai." And so, at the annual Passover ritual, with its paschal lamb and unleavened bread, its bitter herbs and its solemn verbal recital of God's mightiest of His mighty acts of deliverance, he knew *himself* to have been redeemed from bondage in Egypt. Further, he looked forward as well as backwards; for him our western tense-distinction between present and future was also dissolved; just as this present feast was a ritual realization of the historic past so, too, it realized proleptically the future feast of joy in the Messianic kingdom. Future as well as past became contemporary in the religiously apprehended "now."

Every believing Christian understands this. What is the Christian Year but a time-sacrament, conveying what it symbolizes through the temporal sequence of its festivals—Advent and Christmas, Epiphany and Lent, Holy Week and Good Friday, Easter and Pentecost? It is the story of our race understood religiously and redemptively, through that gospel story which begins in Eden and ends in the New Jerusalem. Certain historic events thus become perpetually contemporary in Christian worship. For, in Christian worship, present tenses become past, and past tenses present. The Church means what it says when it declares, "Christ the Lord *is* risen today"; or, "This *is* the night in which Thou didst first lead our fathers . . . out of Egypt"; or, when it asks "When they crucified my Lord, *were* you there?"

Further, in proclaiming the gospel from pulpit, altar and baptismal font, the Church is the sacramental instrument for this making-present of divine action in historic time. God's mighty acts in history are actually mediated and conveyed by every proclamation of the gospel today. The *kerugma* is the shewing forth, the re-presentation, of those temporal events in which the kingdom of God came. Real preaching of the Word places those who hear and receive it in the very presence, the *real presence*, of that eschatological event in which the Church had its origin. "As often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup ye do show the Lord's death"; that is, "ye do re-present the drama." Thus the supreme importance of the gospel sacraments lies in their

contemporaneity. In the Eucharist the Church is neither recalling a last supper in an upper room long ago, nor imaging the banquet of the redeemed in the eternal kingdom at the end of history: it is experiencing, now, in one symbolic rite, the *geminus adventus Christi*—His coming in humiliation and His coming in glory.

This, too, has been the Church's solution of a crucial and notorious difficulty. The earliest Christians not only lived in terms of the antinomy "already" and "not yet"; they also said "soon"; they confidently expected the second coming of the Lord, and declared it to be imminent. No verse in the gospels is more difficult than Mark 13:30, since this confident expectation was unfulfilled. To say with Schweitzer that Jesus died the victim of a delusion is christologically unconvincing. To say with J. A. T. Robinson that such precise notes of temporal urgency in the New Testament express that moral urgency which is eschatology's essential meaning, is true but hardly satisfying. Robinson quotes II Peter 3:8–9 in support of his contention that true eschatology is concerned with the ultimate divine victory rather than with its date, and that the moment of consummation has nothing to do with the almanack. He is right; but he is on firmer ground in reminding us that the Church survived its misapprehension. "The note of temporal immediacy was a misunderstanding of an urgency itself independent of it" (*In the End, God*, p. 51). It is that urgency which continuously informs and interprets the eschatological "now."

The Risen Jesus Bestows the Spirit: A Study of John 20 : 19-23

F. W. BEARE

In the evening of that day, the first day of the week, the doors being shut where the disciples were, for fear of the Jews, Jesus came and stood in the midst and said to them, "Peace be unto you." And as he said this, he showed them his hands and his side. Then the disciples rejoiced at seeing the Lord. So he said to them again, "Peace be unto you. As the Father has sent me, so do I send you." And when he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them, "Receive Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained."

THIS pericope contains one of the four resurrection-stories of the Gospel proper, apart from the sequence of chapter 21, which is generally regarded as an appendix to the work and attributed to the group which sponsored and published it after the death of the author. We have first the story of the finding of the empty tomb by St. Mary Magdalene, which is verified by St. Peter and the beloved disciple; but there is no appearance of the Risen One. Next we have the story of the appearance to St. Mary Magdalene. These two stories are interwoven; the story of the two disciples (vv. 2–10) is interpolated into the story of Mary (vv. 1, 11–18), which is independently conceived; this is seen from the mention of the angels (v. 12), who play no part in the experience of the two disciples. Our pericope is the third episode in the sequence, telling of the appearance of the risen Jesus to the whole body of the disciples. The fourth story tells of a second appearance to the group, one week later, by which the doubts of Thomas are overcome.

It will be evident that this entire sequence has no relationship to the earlier tradition which is first summed up for us by St. Paul, that Jesus "appeared to Cephas, then to the Twelve; then he appeared to more than five hundred brethren at once . . . then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles; and last of all he appeared also to me, as it were the abortion" (I Cor. 15:5–8). St. Paul's list is not necessarily exhaustive; the Evangelist's is certainly not; but there is no getting around the fact that in the Fourth Gospel, Jesus appears first to St. Mary Magdalene, not to St. Peter. This story, and indeed the entire Johannine sequence of resurrection-stories, is not framed in accord with the traces of the earlier tradition which we find in St. Paul or with the deposit which has found place in the Synoptic Gospels.

On the other hand, it is clear that this story is integrally related to the whole structure of the Fourth Gospel itself. At the very beginning, Jesus has been designated by John the Baptist as "he who baptizes with Holy Spirit" (1:33)—in contrast with John himself, who was sent to baptize with

water. In converse with Nicodemus (c. 3), Jesus has spoken of the necessity of a rebirth, or birth from above, a birth "of water and of Spirit," for all who would see or enter into the Kingdom of God; he does not as yet indicate himself as the minister of such a baptism. He has then spoken to the Samaritan woman (4:10ff.) of the gift of living water which he is to give, which will become in the recipient "a fountain of water leaping up to eternal life"; and while this gift is not explicitly identified with the gift of the Holy Spirit, the significance of the symbolism would not be doubtful to any Christian reader. Again, at the Feast of Sukkoth, Jesus "stood and cried, 'If any man thirst, let him come to me; and let him drink, who believes on me. As the Scripture has said, Out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water' " (7:37–38). Here, however, the Evangelist has made the interpretation of the symbolism explicit. "This he said concerning the Spirit which those who believed on him were to receive; for the Spirit was not yet (given), because Jesus was not yet glorified" (v. 39). It is the glorified Jesus who is to be the giver of the Spirit. And this aspect of the thought is developed with still greater emphasis in the Farewell Discourses (cc. 14–16), where the promise of the Holy Spirit as the Paraclete who will abide with them forever is brought into the closest relationship with the going away and coming again of Jesus. "I will ask the Father and he will give you another Paraclete, that he may be with you forever, even the Spirit of Truth; . . . you know him, because he abides with you and is in you. I will not leave you orphans: I am coming to you" (14:16–18); and still more explicitly: "It is expedient for you that I go away, for if I do not go away, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you"—and after a considerable exposition of the activities of the Spirit: "A little while and you behold me no more; and again a little while, and you shall see me" (16:7,16).

Another of the Paraclete passages (14:26–28) shows a striking parallelism with our pericope in its association of no fewer than four themes which are here resumed: (1) the conferring of the Spirit; (2) the promise of Peace—there twice assured, here twice spoken; (3) the promise, here fulfilled, "I go away, and I come unto you"; and (4) the joy that banishes fear; "Let not your hearts be troubled, nor let them be fearful . . . if you loved me, you would have rejoiced that I go to the Father." These last words anticipate the fuller assurance of joy to follow sorrow that is found in 16:20f. "You shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy . . . I will see you again, and your hearts shall rejoice, and your joy no one shall take from you."

Again, the wording of the "evidential" clause, as we may term it—"he showed them his hands and his side"—is notable for its difference from the Lucan: "he showed them his hands and his feet" (Luke 24:40). The form of this saying takes up the particular and unique Johannine interest in the story that the side of Jesus was pierced with a spear "and there came out blood and water" (19:34). The care which the Evangelist takes to assure us of the truth of this statement shows that it has for him a significance that is

more than merely factual. It is a symbol of the two major sacraments, and the water is at once the water of baptism and the Holy Spirit, the "living water" which shall flow out of his belly (as in 7:37f., above).

The apostolic commission—"As the Father has sent me, so do I send you"—takes up the words of the prayer: "As thou didst send me into the world, so I sent them into the world" (17:18); and they reflect the characteristically Johannine thought that the relation between Jesus and his disciples is patterned upon the relation between the Father and the Son; cf. 15:19: "As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you." The words reiterate the conviction that the mission of the church is the continuance of the mission of the Son of God. As the Fourth Gospel never suggests that the mission of Jesus is limited to Israel, it is unnecessary to emphasize (as does Matthew) that the disciples are to go to all nations. There has never been any question of a more limited mission. The Light of the world has come into the *world*; God sent his Son, that the *world* through him might be saved; and his church enters into that world-wide mission.

The words which confer authority to forgive or to retain sins (v. 23) are not in the least Johannine either in form or in content. As Bauer remarks: "Here, for the first and only time in his book, he speaks of the forgiveness of sins, which is not at all in keeping with his conception of Christianity, but is rather an accommodation to the thoughts of the community or to his source-material."[1] The task of the disciples has not hitherto been set before them in any comparable terms; Jesus has spoken to them of "witnessing," and of "bearing fruit" (15:16, 27; etc.), but never of pronouncing absolution. The phrasing offers further difficulty in that it is not paralleled anywhere in the New Testament or for that matter in other early Christian writings, so far as I can discover. "To forgive sins" is of course a familiar enough phrase, but nowhere else do we find the words "to retain sins" (*kratein hamartias*). The double phrase probably derives ultimately from something akin to the Matthaean saying: "Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven" (Matt. 18:18; cf.16:19). The Johannine words appear to be an ecclesiastical interpretation or application of the idea of "binding" and "loosing" to the reception of converts and the discipline of penitence. They can hardly be of the Evangelist's own framing, since they are given "in a terminology otherwise foreign to John" (R. Bultmann). Yet it may be remarked that they do serve to relate the continuing work of the church to the mission of Jesus as it was first defined in this Gospel in the testimony of the Baptist, as "taking away the sin of the world" (1:29). And again, there is a real correspondence between the double function of retaining and remitting sins, to be exercised by the church under the authority conferred by

1. *Das Johannesevangelium*, 3rd ed. (1933), *ad loc.* (Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum N.T.*, 6). Cf. R. Bultmann's preliminary discussion of the pericope in his commentary on the Gospel (Meyer's *Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das N.T.*, XII, 11th ed. [1950]).

Christ, and the double effect of the mission of Jesus himself—the salvation of those who believe and the condemnation of those who put themselves outside the pale by unbelief. One might even claim that there is a touch of the Johannine in the association of the authority to retain or remit sins with the conferring of the Spirit; for we have been told that the Spirit, when he comes, will "convict the world concerning sin and concerning righteousness and concerning judgment" (16:8).

While the pericope thus takes up and brings together so many of the main threads of the Gospel as a whole, it should be noted that it is framed in complete independence of that which immediately precedes and also of that which follows. Except for the one phrase "on that day," which makes an editorial connection, the story is complete in itself and could very well stand by itself as the one necessary report of the appearance of the risen Jesus to his disciples. It takes no account of the idea that two of the company have seen the empty tomb, or have heard any testimony from St. Mary Magdalene; nor would anyone reading the story itself suspect that Thomas was absent. This independence of the immediate context indicates that the Evangelist has made use of a story current in the oral tradition of the church, which like Luke 24:36–49 and Matthew 28:16–20 (though not dependent on either of these passages) told of the appearance of the risen Jesus to his assembled disciples, of their recognition of him, and of his commission to them of their task. It has been transmitted to him, not as part of the sequence in which it is now found, but as a self-contained unit. At the same time, the complex and varied correspondences with leading themes of the Gospel, in ways peculiar to this writing, make it evident that it has been largely reshaped by the Evangelist in keeping with his characteristic symbolic treatment of the tradition as a whole. He has once again indicated his identification of the promised coming of Jesus with his living presence in the church as its risen and glorified Lord, and with the coming of the Holy Spirit. Easter, Pentecost, and Parousia are to all intents and purposes one. The clause "he showed them his hands and his side" is in part evidential, as in Luke 24:39–40. To some commentators, this seems an unmotivated exhibition. Some have regarded it as an interpolation brought in to prepare the way for the story of the overcoming of Thomas's doubts; at least one recent scholar (R. Bultmann) suggests that in the source used by the Evangelist there must have been something corresponding to the Lucan picture of the fright of the disciples (Luke 24:37). But none of this seems necessary. Apart from the evidential interest, which is alone apparent in Luke, the clause here serves the purpose of establishing the identity of the risen Lord of the church, the giver of the Spirit, with the crucified Jesus.

The Insufflation itself—"he breathed upon them and said to them, 'Receive Holy Spirit' "—is a reminiscence of the creation-story; it employs the very verb of Gen. 2:7 (LXX): "The Lord God . . . breathed into his nostrils (LXX—"his face") the breath of life." The deliberate choice of this word suggests that this is the New Creation, by which the flesh that

cannot see or enter into the Kingdom of God (3:3–7) is filled with the Spirit, the divine nature, which alone has life and immortality. But more than this, it serves to identify the Spirit which inhabits the church with the Spirit of Jesus.

Two things remain to be said about the authorization to retain and to remit sins. First, the use of the perfects (*apheōntai, kekratēntai*—"they are forgiven, are retained") cannot be taken in the sense that the church merely declares the remission or retention of sins that have already been retained or remitted in heaven. The force is that the apostolic sentence is forthwith confirmed—is effective as soon as spoken. Secondly, the words are probably meant to bear upon the exercise of authority within the church for the discipline of her own members as well as upon her authority to remit the sins of converts whom she admits to baptism and to retain the sins of those who refuse to believe the gospel. The words mark the inauguration of the church as a society entrusted with divine power to control her recruitment and to exercise her own discipline of penitence.

There is the further question of whether this commission is entrusted to the disciples, and this authority conferred upon them, *qua* apostles, the personal bearers of authority within the church; or *qua* believers, simply in their quality as members of the Christian community. Is the scene conceived as the establishment of the order of Apostles (more generally, of the holy ministry), or as the constitution of the church? The answers given seem to be in accord with the ecclesiastical predilections of the commentators. Lutheran scholars generally tend to hold that it is the community that receives the commission to go into the world, and the authority to forgive or to retain sins; Anglicans and Romans are more inclined to hold that the Apostles are alone envisaged in the grant of authority. It is hardly possible to make a decision upon the basis of the pericope alone; it is part of the wider question of how the discourses of chapters 13 to 16 are to be understood—whether the disciples who hear them are addressed as the limited apostolic company, or as representing the whole church. If we include the prayer of chapter 17 in our reference, we shall be obliged to give a good deal of weight to the distinction explicitly made between the immediate disciples —"these alone"—for whom the Lord prays, and the wider community of all whom he includes in his intercession—"those who believe on me through their word" (v. 20). The controversy is in the last analysis irrelevant, for there is at this stage no possible distinction between the church as the community of all believers and the apostolic band which is to serve it. At the beginning, the two are identical—the church consists of the apostles who are here commissioned. And before we press too far the distinction between "these alone" and "those who believe on me through their word," let us take note that the prayer is made to the end "that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee" (17:21).

To sum up, the story of the Insufflation, which has also been called the Johannine Pentecost, appears to be based upon a story which has taken

shape in an earlier stage of the tradition. This is not to say that it goes back to an apostolic reminiscence of the experiences of the first Easter Day, but rather that it was a popular legend of evidential character, of the same kind as the story in Luke 24:36–49 which we have noticed. In the Lucan story, there is little else but the evidential interest, with its stress on the physical character of the resurrection-body of the Lord. In the handling of the Fourth Evangelist, however, this legend has been almost wholly transformed into myth with a wide range of significance. The emphasis on the physical is at least modified by the indication that the risen Jesus appears in a room with closed doors—though it must be granted that the Lucan story does not read as if Jesus in his very tangible body, which can be handled and can eat broiled fish (to which some manuscripts add for good measure a honeycomb), has walked in through the door! It is only that the popular legend remains in a much cruder form in Luke. The main concern of the Johannine story lies elsewhere. It has here become the myth of the founding of the church with the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, the commission to take up and continue the mission of Jesus in the world, and the authority to remit or retain sins. To this the evidential motive is secondary, but by no means unimportant. It is, however, less concerned to insist on the physical character of the resurrection-body than to affirm the identity of the risen Lord with the crucified Jesus, and the identity of the Spirit given to the church with the Spirit of Jesus.

Further than that, the Evangelist is concerned to show that the Resurrection of Jesus and the giving of the Spirit are not wholly transcendental events, but are tied to time and place; just as the authority to retain and remit sins belongs to the temporal life of the church. It is, in a way, the converse to this Evangelist's treatment of the Crucifixion. All through the passion-story, and indeed by intimations beforehand, he has presented the Crucifixion as itself the "lifting up" (*hypsosis*) of Jesus—his "going to the Father." That is to say, he has interpreted an event which undoubtedly took place externally, in the concrete sphere of history, as at the same time a transcendental event in which the love of God was fully and finally manifested and the glory of the Son revealed—the glory which he had with the Father before the world was made (17:5). In the Cross itself, the Son was glorified even as he was glorifying the Father in the perfection of love and obedience. So in this narrative of the Insufflation, the Evangelist has treated the Resurrection, in itself primarily a transcendental event, as having its necessary expression in concrete and temporal experience.

A Milestone in Canadian Theology: Bishop Kingdon's *God Incarnate*

EUGENE R. FAIRWEATHER

I

JUST over fifty years ago, in October, 1907, one of Canada's most distinguished theologians died in Fredericton, New Brunswick. Hollingworth Tully Kingdon had served the Canadian Church as pastor and scholar for more than twenty-six years—first as coadjutor to the redoubtable John Medley, and then as second Bishop of Fredericton. The *Canadian Churchman* obituary spoke of his scholarly attainments in the highest terms: "He was a man of wide and extensive learning, and it is questionable if in his own line he had his equal on this side of the Atlantic. . . . It is not at all likely that we in Canada at all events will see his equal again in the matter of scholarship."[1] In the same vein, his Cathedral Chapter's memorial resolution, after paying tribute to his energetic concern for the Church's work in "the poor and needy portions of the diocese," emphasized his academic distinction: "His ripe and great scholarly attainments were widely recognized by the whole Anglican communion, and were of great service to the Church in Canada, and we believe will be of still greater service in the years to come. His literary works . . . are considered by many noteworthy scholars of the Anglican communion as standard productions, which will ever be recognized by students of Canon Law and Church Doctrine as marks of ripe scholarship, sound learning and great ability."[2]

Among Bishop Kingdon's published writings, the *Canadian Churchman* emphasized his "very valuable work on the Incarnation of our Lord, by which he will be mainly remembered." At the time of their publication in 1890, Kingdon's Bishop Paddock Lectures, given at the General Theological Seminary, New York, in the same year,[3] had been well received. The *Canadian Churchman*, noting that some of the Paddock Lectures "have been very good, and some others have not been quite so good," concluded that "the present volume is most decidedly above the average."[4] The *Church Quarterly Review* declared that "this remarkable volume, on the highest of all possible themes, will be gratefully welcomed by the Church at large."[5] The *Church Review*, of New York, was still more enthusiastic: "We cannot call to mind any recent work where such an abundance of

1. *Canadian Churchman*, Oct. 24, 1907, p. 685.
2. *Ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1907, p. 721.
3. *God Incarnate*, New York, 1890.
4. *Canadian Churchman*, Oct. 16, 1890, p. 630.
5. *Church Quarterly Review*, Vol. 32 (April–July, 1891), p. 131.

treasures, old and new, have been brought out from the storehouse of the Faith. . . . It is beyond question the theological work of the year."[6]

As one might expect, after such a welcome, Kingdon's book had considerable influence in its day—above all, in the discussion of Christian initiation, which was becoming a live issue among Anglicans. So, for instance, it was used by the anonymous author of an article in the *Church Quarterly Review* on "Primitive Teaching on Confirmation and its Relation to Holy Baptism," together with Father Puller's and Canon Mason's essays, in support of his high doctrine of Confirmation over against Baptism.[7] On the other side of the debate, the immensely learned Darwell Stone pointed to Puller, Mason and Kingdon as the three able advocates of an opinion which he understood to be meeting "with wide and increasing acceptance in the Church of England."[8]

After all this, it is surprising that Kingdon's treatment of an important problem in sacramental theology should have been so completely forgotten, particularly since it is presented in the context of a full Christological synthesis which gives coherent expression to the typical incarnational-sacramental outlook of Anglican theology. Nonetheless, despite the recent renewal of the discussion by Dix, Lampe and others, Father Leeming's listing of Kingdon's book in the bibliography of his *Principles of Sacramental Theology*, apparently on the strength of Stone's comment, seems to be its sole appearance in contemporary theological literature.[9] Under these somewhat peculiar circumstances, a fresh look at one of the most erudite and important volumes to come from a Canadian study during the nineteenth century may not be without interest.

II

By way of introduction, something should be said about Kingdon's life and theological standpoint. A surgeon's son, he was born in London on April 16, 1835, and was educated at St. Paul's School and at Trinity College, Cambridge.[10] He was ordained priest in 1860 by Walter Kerr Hamilton, the saintly Tractarian Bishop of Salisbury. After serving as Vice-Principal of Salisbury Theological College from 1864 to 1869, he joined the staff of the pioneer "ritualistic" parish of St. Andrew's, Wells Street, London.[11] From 1878 to 1881, when he became a bishop, Kingdon was vicar of Good Easter, Essex.

6. *Church Review*, Oct., 1890, p. 299.
7. Cf. *Church Quarterly Review*, Vol. 34 (April–July, 1892), pp. 1–20; F. W. Puller, *What is the Distinctive Grace of Confirmation?* (London, 1880); A. J. Mason, *The Relation of Confirmation to Baptism* (London, 1891).
8. *Church Quarterly Review*, Vol. 45 (Oct., 1897–Jan., 1898), p. 362.
9. Cf. B. Leeming, S.J., *Principles of Sacramental Theology* (London, 1956), pp. 650, 185.
10. Biographical data are taken (unless otherwise indicated) from O. R. Rowley, *The Anglican Episcopate of Canada and Newfoundland* (Milwaukee and London, 1928); J. A. Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, Pt. II:1752–1900, Vol. IV, p. 47.
11. Cf. M. Donovan, *After the Tractarians* (London, 1933), pp. 52, 119; S. L. Ollard, *Short History of the Oxford Movement* (2nd ed., London, 1932), p. 216f., 233.

In 1879 John Medley, Bishop of Fredericton since the creation of the see in 1845, indicated to his synod his readiness to provide the stipend of a much-needed coadjutor, asking however that the nomination be left in his own hands.[12] After considerable discussion the synod passed the requisite canon. Medley proposed Kingdon's name to a specially convened synod on January 12, 1881, and the nomination was approved by overwhelming majorities, clerical and lay, though only after a debate in which the election of a candidate known personally neither to the bishop nor to the synod was criticized as a "leap in the dark."[13] While party tensions remained latent on this occasion, it seems clear that suspicion of Medley as an active supporter of the Tractarian Movement was far from extinct. From this standpoint the *Evangelical Churchman*, Toronto's vigorous hammer of "ritualists" and "sacerdotalists", criticized the "unseemly haste" of the election, and added: "Mr. Kingdon . . . is a member of the disloyal English Church Union and of the Sanctae Trinitatis Confraternitas . . . of Cambridge, a local Ritualistic Society, not so well-known and perhaps not quite so pronounced in its character as the Confraternity of the Blessed Sacrament, but of similar aims and tendencies."[14]

Despite misgivings, when Dr. Kingdon[15] arrived in New Brunswick he made a most favourable impression on his future flock, and the synod of July 5, 1881, unanimously confirmed his election, after hearing testimonials from five eminent English ecclesiastics.[16] On Sunday, July 10, he was consecrated in Fredericton Cathedral by Bishop Medley, the Metropolitan of Canada, assisted by two Canadian and two American bishops. By this time, the *Evangelical Churchman* had so far recovered its equanimity as not only to reproduce without comment a newspaper report which referred no less than three times to the Metropolitan's mitre—in other circumstances one of its *bêtes noires*—but even, while maintaining its opposition to the mode of his election, to express unguarded approval of the new bishop. "Those who urged the canon on," it wrote, "in hope, evidently, of securing an extreme sacerdotalist, are the only disappointed ones. . . . The theological standpoint of . . . Dr. Kingdon, appears to be that of a very moderate high-churchman. . . . He does not belong to any of the advanced societies. He has written in strong condemnation of Fasting Communion. . . ."[17] This optimism was, indeed, somewhat premature, since Kingdon was to become, like Medley, a vice-president of the "disloyal" E.C.U.,[18] but experience was to sustain the *Evangelical Churchman*'s appraisal of Dr. Kingdon as "a

12. Cf. W. Q. Ketchum, *The Life and Work of the Most Reverend John Medley, D.D.* (Saint John, 1893), p. 224f.
13. Cf. *Dominion Churchman*, Jan. 27, 1881, p. 41; *Evangelical Churchman*, Jan. 20, 1881, p. 588.
14. *Ibid.*
15. D.D., *jure dignitatis* (Cantab.), 1881; Hon. D.D. (Trinity), 1885; (King's) 1890; Hon. D.C.L. (Trinity), 1893.
16. Cf. *Evangelical Churchman*, July 28, 1881, p. 186.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 190, 194.
18. Cf. *Church Times*, Sept. 16, 1892, p. 899.

candid, fair-minded man, able to respect the views of those from whom he differs."

After eleven years of strenuous service as assistant to the aged Medley, Kingdon succeeded to the see on September 9, 1892, and was enthroned on November 23. Until heart disease incapacitated him in June, 1906, he presided over the diocese with energy and conspicuous executive ability. For the little time that remained to him he was pretty much an invalid, retaining his episcopal jurisdiction but committing most of his functions to his coadjutor, John Andrew Richardson, after the latter's consecration on November 30, 1906. Kingdon died on October 11, 1907, and was buried four days later in the churchyard of St. John's, Douglas (Nashwaaksis).

"It may be said of Bishop Kingdon", a contemporary wrote, "that, though small of stature, he is quick and resolute of will."[19] This resoluteness, displayed alike in his vigorous pastoral labours, in his literary productivity amidst continual distractions and in the firmness of his rule, was one of his most conspicuous qualities. At the same time, his "transparent and almost rugged sincerity of character,"[20] together with his sympathy and skill as a *pastor pastorum*, seems to have won him widespread affection as well as respect. So, for example, a priest ordained near the end of his episcopate recalled, forty years later, that "he loved an argument, and respected you more when you stood your ground and gave back a quick and like answer." But the same priest could also write: "The Bishop's strong character, and deep spiritual life, his patience and understanding did much to shape my life."[21]

Apart from his *God Incarnate* and from some tracts on Confirmation,[22] Kingdon's theological standpoint and scholarly abilities were chiefly displayed in *Fasting Communion* and in *Divorce and Re-marriage*.[23] *Fasting Communion* is not, in fact, a "strong condemnation" of the custom. Kingdon's aim is simply to show that the practice of abstaining from food and drink from midnight before receiving Holy Communion is a matter of discipline or devotion, a "mandate or counsel", rather than a rigorously binding precept.[24] His concern with this point stems from his experience of a number of younger Tractarian rigorists who are assigning such importance to the "rule" of fasting communion as (in Kingdon's opinion) to discourage reasonable frequency of communion.[25] Far from despising the discipline itself, let alone condemning it, Kingdon speaks clearly of his own lifelong

19. C. H. Mockridge, *The Bishops of the Church of England in Canada and Newfoundland* (London and Toronto, 1896), p. 327.

20. *Canadian Churchman*, October 24, 1907, p. 685.

21. From a privately printed diocesan centennial booklet, *One Hundred Years of Church Life*, pp. 34, 32. (I am indebted to the Ven. A. F. Bate, Archdeacon of Saint John, for a copy of this work.) A partly fictional but lifelike account of Kingdon appears in Basil Partridge, *Chaplet of Grace* (Philadelphia, 1956), pp. 195–98.

22. *Church Quarterly Review*, Vol. 34 (April–July, 1892), p. 7, n.l.

23. *Fasting Communion, Historically Investigated from the Canons and Fathers, and Shown to be not Binding in England*, 2nd ed., London, 1875; *Divorce and Re-marriage*, Montreal and Fredericton, n.d.

24. Cf. *Fasting Communion*, pp. 358, 125.

25. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 2, 367f.

practice,[26] while the entire volume is marked by genuine concern for the spirit of sacramental piety expressed in the tradition of fasting communion. Moreover, there is no doubt in his mind of the right of the Church to require such a discipline by canonical precept; on basic principles he is at one with the rigorists in upholding a "Catholic" view of authority. What he does question—essentially on the basis of the "desuetude" or disuse of the relevant canons in the post-Reformation English Church, rather than on the shaky ground of theories of the independence of the medieval Church of England from the *Corpus Iuris Canonici*—is the present existence in the Anglican Communion of a binding rule, such as the rigorists assume.[27] For thus maintaining, in the interests at once of pastoral discretion and of accuracy in the interpretation of canon law, a position already held by the Tractarian "apostle," John Keble, and later to be taken up by the eminent Anglo-Catholic moral theologian, Kenneth Kirk, Kingdon found himself hailed by some and denounced by others as a prophet of laxism.[28] Whatever view we may take, however, of his possibly tendentious solution of a complex canonical problem, we shall go far astray if we think of him as a moral or canonical laxist. As even a cursory examination of *Divorce and Re-marriage* will show, he accepts authority wholeheartedly once it is clear to him that authority has in fact spoken. Again following Keble, Kingdon fills the pages of this work with evidence from the Fathers and Councils in support of the strict view of the indissolubility of marriage, thus making divorce from the marriage bond inherently impossible. This time, he not only receives the general approval (subject only to the criticism of certain oversimplifications) of so conservative a theologian and careful a scholar as Stone,[29] but also experiences the sincerest form of flattery at the hands of a committee of the Convocation of York. His triumph may seem a trifle ambiguous, since Convocation recommitted the report to enable the committee to check the quotations borrowed by its convener from Kingdon and left unverified by its members,[30] but the whole episode remains something of a tribute to the influence Kingdon could exert even from the dense forests of New Brunswick!

The production of two such substantial treatises is in itself a notable accomplishment for a busy London curate and an even busier Canadian bishop. Kingdon's supreme scholarly achievement, however, as his contemporaries supposed, is unquestionably his study of the Incarnation and its implications. Here, in the first place, we have a weighty essay in theological synthesis, in which the person and the creative and redemptive work of the eternal Word are interpreted in the light of a considerable knowledge of the history of Christian thought, and with an eye open to the problems raised for theology by the philosophy and science of the day. In

26. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 348, 368.
27. Cf. *ibid.*, Pt. I, Chap. III.
28. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 169, 347; K. E. Kirk, *Conscience and its Problems* (London, 1948), p. 277ff.
29. Cf. *Church Quarterly Review*, Vol. 40 (April–July, 1895), p. 37.
30. Cf. *ibid.*; *Guardian*, Feb. 27, 1895, p. 346.

the second place, when he comes to deal with the sacramental "extension" of the Incarnation, Kingdon not only completes his theological synthesis with a clear and solid exposition of Catholic sacramental doctrine, but also makes his third important contribution to historical theology in a discussion of Baptism and Confirmation as sacraments of Christian initiation, to which reference has already been made. Whatever we may think of his thesis in the end, his documentation is an important addition to the evidence needed for the discussion of this problem—an addition all the more impressive because of its appearance a year before Mason's classical presentation of the same case. Both as a systematic theological treatise, then, and as an early and serious contribution to an important theological debate, *God Incarnate* can claim our interest, without any appeal to theological chauvinism.

III

In undertaking the Christological synthesis which is his main concern in the book, Kingdon starts from the prologue to the Fourth Gospel, which provides the "texts" for four of his seven lectures. Now, as in the past, he says, the Johannine corpus is the supreme corrective of doctrinal error, simply because of its forcible and plain witness to the central truth of the Incarnation. In expounding the Johannine teaching, Kingdon begins with the affirmation of the deity of the Logos, and goes on to argue that this truth, manifested in the Resurrection of Christ, fulfils the deepest demand of nature and reason. Developing his argument skilfully, he moves from the order of the universe to divine mind and will as the ground of order, from mind and will to divine "personality," and finally (along the line suggested long ago by Richard of St. Victor) from personality to the interpersonal love declared in the Johannine statement, "God is love." Having thus (he believes) shown the coherence of God's self-revelation in Christ with the ultimate outreach of natural reason, he goes on, on the basis of the full Trinitarian dogma, to expound the mysterious Christian truth of creation through the Word, who is both "Mediator in creation" and "Revealer in illumination."[31]

In thus stating the divine origin of creatures and creaturely life, Kingdon makes what he considers the essential theological point of the Christian doctrine of creation. Having made it, he is concerned to show that it cannot come into real conflict with the facts of nature as rightly interpreted by science. After a digression on the angelic creation, in which he trips unselfconsciously through metaphysical mazes where angels themselves might almost hesitate to tread, he contrasts with the stability of the angelic world the evolutionary development of the visible world, whose history we can read backwards by scientific reason. Having cited Augustine and Aquinas as instances of the readiness of great theologians to admit more in the Genesis narrative than meets the fundamentalist eye, he argues that biblical faith

31. Cf. *God Incarnate*, pp. 1–19.

does not commit believers to notions of "special creation" or fixity of species, and concludes that evolution is not only the most adequate scientific account of the origin of species but also the key to a more splendid picture of God's creative power. With sounder judgment than many Christians of his day, he refuses to try to fit the divine action into gaps in evolutionary doctrine, noting for instance that an evolutionary account of the origins of life would present no real problem for faith. Only in the supraphysical reality of the soul, inbreathed by God, does Kingdon see a "special creation," and even this he understands as the crowning of physical evolution, which makes of man the microcosm, destined to be the centre of God's purpose for the total universe. It is against the background of this sweeping picture of the purpose of man's creation that Kingdon presents the tragic frustration of human destiny by sin and the Fall—again with a sense of the distinction between the truth of faith and the pictorial form of the biblical story.[32]

In the light of this interpretation of the world and man in the world, Kingdon discusses the meaning of the Incarnation itself. As we might expect from his view of man as the microcosm in which the whole universe is fulfilled—a view, incidentally, which he is quite prepared to reconcile, if need be, with the existence of "intelligent agents" on Mars—he adopts the "Scotist" view of the Incarnation as inherent in God's creative purpose rather than simply remedial. What really happened, he urges, is that God's full purpose was carried forward *despite* sin. With this conception of God's purpose constantly in mind, Kingdon speaks of the Old Testament witness through prophecies, types and theophanies, and of the quest for the Christ in the Gentile world. Finally, recalling the old Latin word-play, he tells how, in the fullness of time, the angel's *Ave* began the reversal of the fall of *Eva*, and points to Christ's birth in weakness as God's great act of power for the benefit of all creation.[33]

Kingdon now reaffirms the centrality of the Incarnation as the real heart of Christian faith and life, emphasizing the significance of the Incarnation of the *Word* as proof of the unity of divine purpose in creation and redemption. In this context, and with his eye on the painfully familiar story of Christological error and heresy, he is particularly concerned to show how the Word united to himself human nature in all its creatureliness, yet without spot of sin. In working out this theme, he deals briefly but effectively with a number of problems, notably with Christ's growth in human knowledge, which he explains frankly and realistically, along the lines of Irenaeus' idea of the "quiescence" of the Logos in his human temptation, dishonour, crucifixion and death, while rejecting "kenotic" speculation.[34] Our Lord's growth in wisdom, he writes, "could not have affected the infinite knowledge of God the Son any more than growth of Body could have affected the infinity of His Incomprehensible Majesty. The Fathers discussed the question continually, and came to the conclusion that He was ignorant only as man,

32. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 20–42.
33. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 43–65.
34. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 66–92.

and so far forth as knowledge came to Him through His manhood."[35] What he is trying to avoid is "the error which would suggest in some way that our Blessed Lord somehow laid aside His attributes or essential character as God, which He resumed at the Resurrection and Ascension."[36] This notion, which he regards as incompatible with the true deity of the Son, Kingdon avoids through a consistent and accurate use of the Chalcedonian two-natures principle, which enables him both to affirm Christ's deity without compromise and to offer interesting reflections on such a thoroughly human question as Christ's experience of mirth and laughter.

From this study of the Incarnation and its conditions Kingdon moves on to a discussion of the Atonement. Noting how large a part of the Gospels themselves is given over to the events of Christ's passion and death, he points to a similar emphasis in the apostolic *kerygma*, and adds a comment on the way in which the world of the early Christians was "full of the Cross." Recognizing, however, both the absence of a full exposition of the saving fact of Christ's death and the necessity of guarding against pernicious misinterpretations, he feels bound to offer at least a brief theological statement in the light of his own principles. Sin, as he sees it, is a disorder, contrary to the purpose of man's creation. Man, cut off from God by this unnatural disorder, which he recognizes as a denial of the objective order of creation, hides himself in shame and guilt. Out of this awareness of guilt spring at least certain features of the practice of sacrifice—notably, Kingdon thinks, the widespread rite of human sacrifice. All such ritual acts, however, are inadequate, and only the divine action which they typify—the self-sacrifice of the Word incarnate—can effectually restore human nature to the purpose for which God gave it being. This self-sacrifice Kingdon interprets by means of three categories which he finds in Scripture: propitiation or sin-offering (carefully explained to avoid ideas of a transaction between an angry Father and loving Son), redemption or ransom (understood as a Godward act, on the basis of Exodus 13:13), and atonement or reconciliation. This objective presentation of the Godward act of Christ is complemented by some brief reflections on the Christian life of faith and love, of death and resurrection in Christ.[37]

The exposition of the mystery of creation and redemption, which occupies a little less than two-thirds of the book, is followed by two chapters in which Kingdon discusses the communication of Christ's salvation to believers. Most of the first of these is devoted to the sacraments, treated as an "extension of the Incarnation." In this survey, Kingdon discusses the seven sacraments of Catholic tradition: Baptism, the initial sacrament of union with God; Confirmation, presented as the completion of Baptism through the gift of the Holy Ghost; Absolution (general as well as private) as the

35. *Ibid.*, p. 87f.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 79. With this should be contrasted the rather confused theology of Charles Gore's statement in his Bampton Lectures on *The Incarnation of the Son of God* (New York, 1896), p. 170f.
37. Cf. *God Incarnate*, pp. 93–125.

extension of baptismal forgiveness to postbaptismal sin; the Eucharist, considered both as sacrifice and as sacrificial banquet; Holy Orders, as the transmission of spiritual authority through sacramental succession; Marriage, as the type of the union between Christ and his Church; and Unction, which he supposes to have been replaced in the Anglican Church by the "solemn visitation of the sick."[38] The remaining chapter covers much of the same ground in the light of the further idea of the function of the Spirit as perfecting the work of the Word, both in the creation of nature and in the "new creation." On this basis, Kingdon first expounds his view of the Catholic Church as the temple of the Holy Spirit, and then reformulates his theory of the relation of Baptism and Confirmation and deals briefly with one or two other questions in sacramental theology.[39]

Kingdon's interpretation of Christian initiation, while it is presented in his text as one element in his theological synthesis and has been duly noted in our survey, deserves at least a brief paragraph of its own, both because of the care with which he documents it in about twenty-five pages of appended notes and on account of its considerable influence in the debates of his own day, not to mention its possible importance for contemporary theology. As is generally known, the Oxford Movement laid great emphasis on "baptismal regeneration" as taught in the Prayer Book. Fifty years later, some "high church" theologians, including Kingdon, added to this doctrine a new emphasis on Confirmation as the essential completion of Baptism, apart from which (in the normal sacramental economy) the indwelling presence of the Spirit is not bestowed. Though criticized by many able theologians, this idea has reappeared in our own day, and must now be reckoned with both as influencing pastoral practice and as affecting the attitude of at least some Anglicans towards non-episcopal churches. In any assessment of the idea and its implications, Kingdon's scholarly presentation will have its own peculiar value, because of his skill in making patristic learning and systematic formulation complement each other.[40]

As we look over Kingdon's book once again, it may well be that we shall be less unreservedly enthusiastic than its readers in 1890. For one thing, so short yet so comprehensive a book inevitably takes for granted many points of detail which we, after more than six decades of historical research, can no longer assume. Moreover, in an age of lively philosophical conflict, full of Marxists, Thomists, existentialists, positivists and such-like, the typical Tractarian lack of philosophical sophistication may seem an almost crippling defect. And yet, we must not overlook the remarkable positive values of Kingdon's work, akin as it was in many ways to the developing "liberal

38. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 126–171.
39. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 172–206.
40. Kingdon's view is succinctly expressed in a Confirmation sermon, preached on Sept. 18, 1881 (*Evangelical Churchman*, Oct. 6, 1881, p. 351): "You have come here to-day to complete baptism, to fill up what was begun in baptism. As in baptism your body was consecrated to God, so in confirmation should the Holy Spirit dwell in your hearts, filling your whole being as the temple of Solomon was filled after it was consecrated."

Catholicism" of Gore and others. Like the "liberal Catholics," Kingdon showed a healthy respect for scientific and historical facts and a healthy horror of committing faith to obscurantism. Like the "liberal Catholics" again, he displayed a new openness to philosophical considerations, even if he also shared the limitations of their knowledge of the history of Christian philosophy. When he parts company with the "liberal Catholics"—for example, in his rejection of the Christological monstrosity of "kenoticism", with which Gore himself so disastrously flirted—it is perhaps to the credit of his theological and metaphysical judgment. All things considered, he is a theologian to be remembered with respect—and even to be read, with attention and appreciation.

The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept *Justitia*

ROBERT D. CROUSE

I

THE problem of the translation and interpretation of important philosophical and theological terms is not a new one. The grandson of Ben Sirach summed up the matter many centuries ago, when he explained, in the Prologue to *Ecclesiasticus*, that "the same things uttered in Hebrew, and translated into another language, have not the same force in them; and not only these things, but the law itself, and the prophets, and the rest of the books have no small difference, when they are spoken in their own language." He therefore begged his readers "to pardon us, wherein we may seem to come short of some words, which we have laboured to interpret."

The misgivings of Ben Sirach's grandson may well be shared by modern Christian theologians, for our theological vocabulary contains a host of Hebrew, Greek and Latin words, many of which possess, in their original contexts, a richness of meaning which cannot possibly be conveyed by the one-to-one matching of modern words with the originals. The difficulty is heightened when the only modern words available for translation already have significant non-theological associations, and meanings are imputed which were never intended by the original authors. A notorious case in point, which has received extensive (if not, indeed, excessive) attention in modern theology is that of *agapē* and *eros*, which has already been profitably discussed in the pages of this journal.[1]

It is the object of this present paper to suggest that a serious problem exists in the translation and interpretation of *justitia*, one of the key words of Latin Patristic and Medieval theology, with particular reference to the theology of St. Anselm of Canterbury. The obvious English equivalent of this word is "justice." But in English usage, "justice" ordinarily bears the somewhat limited meaning of fair or equitable conduct towards one's fellow man, or else the still narrower meaning of the exercise of authority in judicial proceedings, in the context of positive law. Some modern interpreters of Latin philosophical and theological texts, who bring this narrow understanding of the term "justice" to their treatment of *justitia* in Latin authors, find that they must reject or apologize for what they regard as the illicit use of legalistic concepts. Other writers recognize that in Latin usage the term *justitia* bears a much broader meaning, and attempt to solve the problem by

1. A. S. Dewdney, "*Agape and Eros: a critique of Nygren*," Vol. I (1955), pp. 19ff.

translating it sometimes as "justice," sometimes as "righteousness." While this method has the definite advantage of treating the concept of *justitia* as more than a legalistic one, it also has defects. At worst, it makes the term *justitia* appear as completely equivocal; at best, it misses the essential relationship between theological, moral and legal concepts in Medieval theology and political theory, originally emphasized by the common use of this term in these several contexts.

II

The concept of *justitia* is clearly a central one in St. Anselm's theological system. Without a proper understanding of his use of this term one cannot begin to make sense of his important formulation of the theory of the Atonement (in the *Cur Deus homo*, and elsewhere), his extremely influential definition of Original Sin (in the *De conceptu virginali*), and his definition of Truth (in the *De veritate*); for *justitia* occurs as a key term in each of these discussions. While his use of the concept in each of these contexts is important, it is with reference to the theory of the Atonement that it has presented greatest difficulty to modern interpreters.

It has been the constant complaint of certain modern scholars that St. Anselm's treatment of the Atonement is "legalistic" or "juridical." The view promoted by Adolph Harnack in his famous *History of Dogma*, that the history of the doctrine of the Atonement in the West is a story of the progressive legalizing of religion under the influence of Roman legal theory and the penitential discipline of the Church, is characteristic of much modern thought on his subject.[2] St. Anselm, of course, with his strong emphasis on "justice," is readily represented as the culmination of this legalizing process. Hastings Rashdall was simply expressing in an extreme manner what is in fact the consensus of many scholars, when he wrote: "Anselm appeals to justice, and that in all good faith: but his notions of justice are the barbaric ideas of an ancient Lombard king or the technicalities of a Lombard lawyer rather than the ideas which would have satisfied such a man as Anselm in ordinary human life."[3] Similarly, Bishop Aulén, in his very influential little book, *Christus Victor*, claims that St. Anselm's "whole conception of Atonement is juridical in its inmost essence. . . . The relation of man to God is treated by Anselm as essentially a legal relation for his whole effort is to prove that the atoning work is in accordance with justice."[4] Both Harnack and Aulén (among others) trace the history of this "Latin doctrine of the Atonement" to the supposed transformation of Christian theology by the

2. For a summary of Harnack's view, see his *History of Dogma* (Eng. tr., London, 1897), III, pp. 310ff. It is not our intention to include a survey of modern interpretations of St. Anselm's doctrine. A useful listing of the most important of these is provided by George H. Williams, at the beginning of his recent article, "The Sacramental Presuppositions of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*," *Church History*, XXVI (1957), pp. 245–274, which itself represents a most significant re-interpretation of St. Anselm's theory as "penitential-eucharistic" in character.

3. *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (London, 1919), p. 355.

4. Gustaf Aulén, *Christus Victor: An Historical Study of Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement* (Eng. tr., London, 1931), pp. 106f.

importation of legal concepts, particularly by Tertullian and St. Cyprian; a transformation which was carried out more and more thoroughly under the influence of the penitential discipline of the Western Church. No one would claim that the doctrine of the Atonement and the development of penitential discipline were not significantly related, and therefore this kind of explanation, although it is not without difficulties, carries a certain measure of plausibility—particularly if one begins by agreeing with these authors that discussion of the Atonement in terms of *justitia*, and related ideas, is sheer legalism.

It is precisely at this point, however, that some serious questions must be raised. Does St. Anselm mean by *justitia* what we ordinarily mean by "justice" (and its equivalents in other modern languages)? If his concept is not primarily legal, nor even legalistic, but philosophical and theological, what suggestions can be made with respect to the historical background of his formulations? In answer to these questions, we shall attempt very briefly to describe St. Anselm's concept of *justitia*, and then to make some suggestions as to the background of his concept in the theological tradition of the Church.

III

St. Anselm defines *justitia* as a certain rightness, or a certain rectitude of will for its own sake; it is one with truth and rectitude of will.[5] Justice is what God wills, and human justice, or rectitude of will, consists in the subjection of the rational creature in obedience to God's Will.[6] Man was created in a state of justice (*justitia originalis*), and sin is the absence or privation of that justice, for which all men (one man in Adam) are responsible.[7] The basis of sin is the free defection of the rational will; the carnal appetites, not in themselves unjust, become so only by the determination of the will.[8] God, who is supreme justice, justly maintains His honour in the ordering of all things, and it is intolerable that man by disobedience should distort God's order of things, and thus rob the Creator of due honour, without making satisfaction.[9] But sinful man is powerless to restore the order of justice, for "a sinner cannot justify a sinner":[10] so God Himself, in His mercy, intervenes to satisfy His own order of *justitia*, in the work of the God-Man, who alone, true God and perfect man, taking sinless humanity from the Virgin, can offer satisfaction.[11] By their incorporation into Christ's sinless (i.e., just) humanity, the faithful receive the benefits of Christ's atoning sacrifice.[12]

5. Cf. *De veritate*, 12; 3; 4; *De casu diaboli*, 9 (F. S. Schmitt, ed., *S. Anselmi opera omnia*, I, 191ff.; I, 180f.; I, 246).

6. Cf. *Proslog.*, 11; *Medit. III*; *De concept. virg.*, 6; *Cur Deus homo*, I, 11 (Schmitt, I, 109; III, 87; II, 147; II, 68).

7. Cf. *De concept. virg.*, 2; 3; *De casu diaboli*, 16 (Schmitt, II, 141ff.; I, 259ff.).

8. Cf. *De concept. virg.*, 4; *De casu diaboli*, 14 (Schmitt, II, 144; I, 258).

9. Cf. *Cur Deus homo*, I, 13–15; I, 12 (Schmitt, II, 71ff.; 69).

10. *Ibid.*, I, 23 (Schmitt, II, 91).

11. Cf. *Ibid.*, II, 6–8, and the excellent discussion of this matter by E. R. Fairweather (ed.), *A Scholastic Miscellany* (Philadelphia, 1956), pp. 56ff. On the relation of justice to mercy, cf. *Proslog.*, 9–11, and Fairweather, *op. cit.*, p. 80, n. 36.

12. On the mode of this incorporation, particularly on the rôle of the Eucharist, see Williams, *art. cit.*, pp. 260ff.

Thus creation, sin and redemption are set by St. Anselm within the framework of God's *justitia*, His right ordering of all things, which prescribes man's place in the hierarchy of created beings, judges his defection, and effects his reconciliation.

In the light of this brief summary of evidence, it should be obvious that an interpretation of St. Anselm's concept of *justitia* in terms of legal justice, or even of moral righteousness, is quite inadequate. The essential content of the term for him (as, indeed, for other Patristic and Medieval authors) is rectitude of order, which has its source in God Himself, and embraces the whole order of creation, regulating the relations of man to God, of man to man, and mutual relations within the interior being of man. Thus, when he uses the term in theological or philosophical discussion, he is not borrowing a concept from the courts of law, for legal justice is only one aspect of *justitia*—God's justice as it is expressed in the organized maintenance of social order; nor is his concept limited to moral righteousness, for that too is only one aspect of *justitia*—the conformity of man's free actions to the all-embracing standard of God's justice. We must concede to the critics that he does sometimes use the language of positive law; but we must not allow these legal illustrations to obscure the more fundamental theological meaning of *justitia* as universal rectitude of order.

IV

When St. Anselm, in the eleventh century, used the term *justitia* to express that rectitude of order which is the Will of God, he was not coining a new word, nor was he imparting new meaning to an old word; in fact, he was not being original at all. The term, in this sense, had for many centuries occupied a prominent place in philosophical and theological discussion, and it is incomprehensible, to say the least, that St. Anselm's critics seem to have succeeded in either ignoring or obscuring this fact. To write the history of this concept, one would have to recount the greater part of the development of Greek philosophy and Roman legal theory, of Hebrew religion and St. Paul's theology, as well as a substantial portion of Patristic and Medieval theology. We shall undertake here very briefly to indicate only a few of the more significant features of the history of the concept in the philosophical, Biblical and Latin Patristic traditions.[13]

The Greek idea of justice (*dikē*) was initially a religious idea. The essential concept was that of the retribution which counters wrong-doing, either as an external deity, or as the reign of law or fate. In the Pre-Socratic philosophers, the concept is associated with the balance and equilibrium of the elements. All of these ideas are summed up in the philosophical elaboration of the concept of *dikaiosunē* (justice), particularly in the thought of Plato, who devoted one of his major works (the *Republic*) to this subject.

13. For fuller surveys, with extensive documentation, see G. del Vecchio, *Justice* (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1952), cc. II–IV, and G. Quell and G. Schrenk, *Righteousness* (Eng. tr., from G. Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch*, London, 1951).

For him, justice is a virtue of right order or proportion, and is equivalent to *aretē*, or virtue in general. For Plato, for his disciple, Aristotle, and for the Greek tradition generally, justice is most fundamentally a virtue of balance and harmony in the relationships of man with man, and in the mutual relationships of the parts of the human soul. Chiefly through Cicero, this philosophical concept of justice found its way into Roman legal theory; but even in that context, the idea is clearly philosophical, referring to a principle underlying the order of nature, the eternal and immutable expression of the sovereignty of God.[14] It is this concept of justice, and not a legalistic (in the modern sense) notion, which the Church Fathers, including Tertullian, derive from Roman sources.

For the Hebrews, the concept of the justice of God was central. God is the fountain of justice, and the source of the justice of law. He Himself, in His faithfulness, constitutes the norm of justice: "A just weight and balance are the Lord's." His justice is expressed in the ordering of creation, where God is the orderer of all things, weighing the hills in a balance and giving the water its limit; ordering all things by measure, number and weight.[15] Human justice is considered to be a matter of right relationship to God, brought about primarily by obedience to God's justice as expressed in the Law. The just man is the man who walks with God.

When the seventy-two elders, as tradition has it, were assembled at Alexandria to translate the sacred books of the Hebrews into Greek, they were faced with precisely the problem stated by Ben Sirach's grandson. It is of no small importance that they chose the Greek term *dikē* (and its derivatives) to translate the usual Hebrew term for justice (*çedheq*, and its derivatives). For all who read these writings in Greek, the ideas associated with the Greek term would inevitably be blended with the Hebrew concept. Philo Judaeus, writing some centuries later from the same Alexandrian background, shows how effectively these ideas could be blended by a philosophically minded Jew. St. Paul, who was familiar with both the Hebrew and the Greek of the Scriptures, chose the same Greek word (*dikaiosunē*) to express the justice of God, a central idea in his theology, both as an attribute of God, and as a quality in man caused by God.

The earliest Latin translators of the Bible (and let us remember that the earliest versions were at least as early as Tertullian)[16] did the obvious when they rendered *dikaiosunē* by the Latin *justitia*, which had long since been established as its equivalent in the philosophical vocabulary of Cicero and others. The Latin Church Fathers, who used the term generously, accepted the full implications of both Biblical and philosophical usage. The term had,

14. For these ideas in Plato, see particularly *Republic*, 443 d–e; 352 a (Cf. J. Wild, *Plato's Theory of Man*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, pp. 156ff.); in Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. V; in Cicero, cf. R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Political Theory in the West* (Edinburgh and London, 1903), pp. 5f., with references.

15. Cf. *Prov.* 16: 11; *Job* 28: 25; 38: 5, 10, 12; Wisd. 11: 22.

16. Cf. P. de Labriolle, *Histoire de la littérature latine chrétienne* (3 ed., Paris, 1947), I, pp. 69ff.

naturally, some legal reference, but that reference was, as for the Biblical authors and the philosophers, derivative. Even in the case of Tertullian, whose legal background is supposed to have been decisive, it is impossible to maintain (as critics of the "Latin doctrine of the Atonement" would like to do) that the concept of justice is primarily legal.

The Latin Fathers repeat much of the traditional philosophical teaching on the subject of justice, as one of the cardinal virtues, and as the whole of virtue.[17] Justice includes (as for Cicero and Philo) the virtue of piety as God-ward justice; hence there can be no true justice without the worship of the one true God. The whole of justice, as St. Ambrose explains, is founded upon piety, and from it arises true charity, which prefers others to self, and seeks not its own. The Christian era is the age of justice, and the Church is the form of justice.[18] For Tertullian, the *justitia* of God is not in any narrow sense a forensic concept: it is particularly related to God's activity as *ordinator* in creation; in accordance with his justice (which is correlative to his goodness) he distinguished created beings and determined their natures. All the hierarchy of heaven and earth is the expression of the justice of God; and his judicial action is related primarily to the ordering of creation, and only secondarily to the judgment of evil.[19] Because of man's place in this hierarchy of justice, as Lactantius in particular argues, justice for man consists primarily in *pietas*, the knowledge and worship of God; and the neglect of this duty is tantamount to the expulsion of justice from the life of man and society.[20]

Some more specific theological applications of the concept of justice were made by several Church Fathers (St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Athanasius, St. Ambrose, and others) especially with reference to the work of Christ, and man's bondage to the devil; but perhaps enough has already been said to indicate the general nature of the concept itself, as it appeared in Latin Christian tradition. It is really to St. Augustine that we must turn for the full elaboration of the concept of *justitia* in many theological applications.

V

The Bishop of Hippo was not, at least in the ordinary sense of the word, a "systematic" theologian. The obscurity of his views on many important philosophical and theological themes is more than adequately attested by the controversies which have surrounded his name during the fifteen centuries

17. Cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.*, II, 12 (*CSEL*, 47, 351); Lactantius, *Instit.*, V, 5 (*CSEL*, 19/1, 413); Ambrose, *In Luc.*, V, 62; *De paradiso*, III, 22 (*CSEL*, 32/1, 207; 279).

18. Cf. Ambrose, *De offic.*, I, 49: 252; 27: 127 (*PL*, 16, 107; 65f.); *De paradiso*, III, 22 (*CSEL*, 32/1, 279); *De offic.*, I, 29: 142 (*PL*, 16, 70).

19. Cf. *Adv. Marc.*, II, 12; 13 (*CSEL*, 47, 351ff.). We agree with G. L. Prestige (*God in Patristic Thought*, London, 1952, pp. xxv, 97f.) that the modern interpretation of Tertullian's thought as "juristic" needs serious modification.

20. Cf. *Instit.*, V, 14; 6 (*CSEL*, 19/1, 446; 418).

since his death. Yet the discerning reader of the Augustinian *corpus* will note the omnipresence of certain key concepts which contribute a unity and a coherence to the whole. One such concept is *caritas*. Another is *justitia*.

The concept of *justitia*, in a wide variety of contexts, runs like a thread through St. Augustine's pages, not only in the discussion of political theory, but also with reference to the central theological questions of the Nature of God, man, sin, and the Atonement. The concept is not primarily political, for, as several modern interpreters of St. Augustine's political thought have pointed out, his use of the concept in the doctrine of the State is determined by its theological use.[21] We may, for our present purposes, pass over his repetition of justice as one of the four virtues, and as the whole of virtue, and the problem of political justice, and devote our attention to his more specifically theological uses of the concept.

Justitia is first of all attributed to God, who is Himself the highest justice. In creation, He is *justissimus ordinator*,[22] who orders all things in number, measure and weight, in a pattern of which the eternal law (the Divine Reason, or the Will of God) is the supreme exemplar.[23] This ordered hierarchy of created beings, most aptly described by Etienne Gilson as "physical justice,"[24] is simply the reflection, or imitation of God's justice as embodied in the eternal law, the pattern of the Divine Ideas. This hierarchy of order and value is reflected in created beings, not only in their external relations to one another and to God, but it also prescribes the internal order of human nature.[25] The truth and goodness of creatures must be seen as their conformity to that eternal justice expressed in the work of God as *justissimus ordinator*.

It is this concept of *justitia* (which is surely very different from modern ideas of the "legal" or "juridical") which occupies so important a place in St. Augustine's view of sin and redemption.[26] Man's original condition is described as that of justice: right relation to God, and (in dependence upon this relation in hierarchy of order) rectitude of order within his own nature. In creation, man received *justitia*, which he lost by sinning.[27] Sin, for St. Augustine, is always the will to do what justice (the order willed by God) forbids, and is never identified with concupiscence, however much the disorder of the passions (laudable in themselves) may be emphasized as the

21. Cf. R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *op. cit.*, I, p. 168; H. X. Arquillière, *L'Augustinisme politique* (Paris, 1934), p. 21.

22. *De civ. Dei*, XI, 17; cf. *Epist.* CXX, 4: 19 (*CSEL*, 40/1, 536; 34, 721).

23. Cf. *De trin.*, III, 9: 16 (*PL*, 42, 878); *Contra Faust.*, 22: 27; *De lib. arb.*, I, 51 (*CSEL*, 25, 621; 74, 16).

24. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), p. 77.

25. Cf. *De lib. arb.*, I, 109 (*CSEL*, 74, 32f.); *De trin.*, X, 7 (*PL*, 42, 977).

26. While the several studies of J. Rivière (*Le dogme de la Redemption chez saint Augustin*, Paris, 1933, and others) are the most generally useful for the history of the doctrine of Redemption, their value is diminished, so far as our study is concerned, by the author's preoccupation with the theme (scarcely typical of St. Augustine) of divine justice towards the devil, to the neglect of other important uses of the concept of justice.

27. Cf. *De trin.*, XIV, 15: 21; *Enarr. in ps. CXLIII*, 6 (*PL*, 42, 1052; 37, 1860); *De gen. ad lit.*, VI, 27: 38 (*CSEL*, 28/3, 199).

consequence of original sin or as the incentive to actual sin.[28] Man, having lost, by his defection in Adam, the justice originally granted by God in creation, cannot offer to God *justitia*, his primary obligation to the Deity.[29] And hence it is impossible for him to restore rectitude of order in his relation to God, and within his own nature. Mankind can offer to God no pure offering in propitiation.[30]

God Himself, in His mercy, effects reconciliation in Christ the Mediator, who takes pure humanity from the Virgin, and comes forth as priest and victim; who offers Himself, a pure sacrifice, *hostia immaculata*, by His justice breaking man's bondage to the devil, and fulfilling the requirements of divine *justitia*.[31] The emphasis is placed on the purity and obedience of Christ's humanity: not as God, but as man, He reconciles us to God, restoring the condition of justice on man's side, turning God's judgment to mercy.[32] Man, by participation in Christ, in Baptism, and in day to day renewal, is made just, until finally he reaches that perfection of justice which is also true charity.[33]

VI

The similarity between St. Augustine's concept of justice and that of St. Anselm is striking. One point of similarity has led several modern interpreters to argue that the Anselmian, and later Scholastic, formulation of Original Justice has its basis in St. Augustine.[34] We should like to go farther, and suggest that the Anselmian concept of *justitia* as such, not only with reference to man's original state, but also with reference to the doctrines of God, sin and redemption, is authentically Augustinian. In addition to the general similarity of concept, which is suggested by the foregoing analyses, some further considerations can be adduced in support of our view.

St. Augustine's position as the great teacher of the West in the Middle Ages is completely beyond question. While this is *a fortiori* true of the Early Middle Ages, it is scarcely less true of St. Anselm and of the other great theologians of the Scholastic period. The comment of Matthew of Aqua-

28. Cf. *Op. imperf. contra Jul.*, I, 47 (*PL*, 45, 1067ff.); *De civ. Dei*, XIV, 6; XIX, 21 (*CSEL*, 40/2, 11; 409); *De nupt. et concup.*, I, 23: 25; I, 24: 27; II, 35: 59 (*CSEL*, 42, 237; 239f.; 318); *De perf. justit.*, 8; 9 (*CSEL*, 42, 17f.); *De gen. ad lit.*, X, 12: 20f. (*CSEL*, 28/3, 309f.). In the light of these and countless similar texts, it is difficult to see how the fundament of original sin for St. Augustine is anything other than the free defection of the rational will (cf. E. Portalie, "Augustin (saint)", *Dict. de théol. cath.*, I, 2396). While St. Anselm's doctrine on this subject may be a break from a common Medieval interpretation of St. Augustine (cf. Fairweather, *op. cit.*, p. 58), it is hardly a break from St. Augustine himself (but see Williams, *art. cit.*, p. 259).

29. Cf. *De pecc. merit. et remiss.*, II, 23: 37 (*CSEL*, 60, 109).

30. Cf. *Enarr. in ps. LXIV*, 6; *CXLIX*, 6 (*PL*, 36, 777; 37, 1953).

31. Cf. *ibid.*, and *De trin.*, XIII, 12–16 (*PL*, 42, 1026ff.).

32. Cf. *Enarr. in ps. CIII*, 4: 8 (*PL*, 37, 1383f.): an important point in St. Augustine (as in St. Anselm) which Aulén has overlooked; cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 75.

33. Cf. *Enchir.*, 14: 52; *Contra Jul.*, II, 9: 31 (*PL*, 40, 256f.; 44, 694); *De perf. justit.*, 8: 17 (*CSEL*, 42, 15f.).

34. Cf. A. Michel, "Justice originelle", *Dict. de théol. cath.*, VIII, 2031; J. B. Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel d'après saint Thomas* (Paris, 1930), p. 8.

sparta, that St. Augustine is the "exemplary doctor, whom catholic doctors, and especially theologians, ought to follow,"[35] is naturally to be expected from an Augustinian; but the sentiment would certainly be shared by St. Thomas Aquinas, of whom Professor Gilson writes that he "would have considered himself a true disciple of Augustine."[36] St. Anselm clearly testifies to his own indebtedness, when he writes, in the Preface to the *Monologion*: "I have been able to find nothing I have said which is not in agreement with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, and especially of Blessed Augustine."[37]

The whole effort of Early Medieval Christian thought could be summed up (with few exceptions) as an attempt to understand what the great Bishop of Hippo had said; and it should not be surprising that when Medieval intellectual life began to blossom afresh in St. Anselm, its colour was brilliantly Augustinian. The fact that some earlier and later Augustinians held views different from those of St. Anselm on some important issues should not be allowed to mislead us. Bernhard Geyer's remarks,[38] to the effect that St. Anselm understood St. Augustine to a greater extent than any before him had done, are much to the point, and might be extended to include many later theologians and historians as well.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that St. Anselm's distinction was not primarily as a legal or political theorist, but as a theologian, and it is somewhat gratuitous to search every possible source other than the theological tradition for enlightenment as to the background and meaning of his leading concepts. Our contention is that there is present in the theological tradition of the Middle Ages, transmitted especially by St. Augustine, a properly philosophical and theological (and only derivatively legal and political) concept of *justitia*; and that any attempt to understand St. Anselm's important theological formulations which ignores the nature and background of this concept is likely to result in serious misinterpretation. *Justitia* in St. Anselm's teaching does not stand for an essentially legal relation, but for that rectitude of order which is the Will of God: a concept which is properly theological, and authentically Augustinian.

35. *Quaest. disput.*, Q. II *de cognit., in resp.* (ed. Quaracchi, I, 252).
36. *Op. cit.*, p. 81.
37. *Monolog., in prolog.* (Schmitt, I, 8).
38. In *Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, II: *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie* (12 ed., Basel, 1951), p. 194.

Preaching from Proverbs

D. K. ANDREWS

THE Book of Proverbs was once widely used as a source for ethical teaching in school and as a basis for sermons on the Christian life in church. Of its influence, George Adam Smith has said, "We cannot overestimate the effect which, at least until a recent date, the regular exposition of the Book of Proverbs, in church and school and home, has exercised upon Scottish character."[1] His words often apply equally well outside of Scotland, for Proverbs has played a major role in moulding common ideas of Christian ethics.

The modern minister, however, is apt to overlook this book in his preaching. The pragmatic matters of ethical and economic life with which it deals do not seem so significant as the theology of Paul. Moreover, the popular idea that its teaching has a purely utilitarian basis makes it suspect from the preacher's point of view. Yet Proverbs, when properly understood, is a storehouse of homiletical material providing texts for sermons, illustrations, and observations which may help the minister understand his people.

Sometimes the reader is puzzled about how to study and use this book. The first impression gained from reading it is of a series of unrelated verses; each verse deals with a new topic, and no steps of logic lead from one to the next. It is a kaleidoscopic survey of city and village life in the Palestinian landscape, but the scenes change so rapidly that they merge into a confused series of highlights and shadows with little meaning.

The sayings in the Book of Proverbs must be studied, as they were intended to be studied by the ancient writers, a few at a time. The method is illustrated in the *Story and Wisdom of Ahikar*, a wisdom book well known to post-exilic Jews. Ahikar, responsible for the education of his nephew Nadin, used to give him a few proverbs to study each day until the wisdom they contained might penetrate his mind and mould his character. The biblical proverbs, likewise, require this gradual process of study and meditation for an appreciation of their truth and their bearing on life.

The real glory of these sayings is that they are pictures taken from life. But they are not photographs which simply display the facts; they are portraits which show important details. Each one reveals a little facet of life as it really is in unmistakable clarity. Sometimes they present the harsh realities of existence that men are prone to ignore. Why should Proverbs contain

1. *The Preaching of the Old Testament to the Age* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1893), p. 30.

statements such as the following, except to remind men that this is the way of life and that it is important to recognize it?

A rich man's wealth is his strong city;
the poverty of the poor is their ruin (10: 15).[2]
Wealth brings many new friends,
but a poor man is deserted by his friend (19: 4).
A gift in secret averts anger;
and a bribe in the bosom, strong wrath (21: 14).
In a multitude of people is the glory of a king,
but without a people a prince is ruined (14: 28).

Wealth does bring security; the poor cannot afford the medical care that would lengthen life or pay the price which would keep their case from being taken to court. The great nations wield great power, but the little nations have many problems. Such sayings remind men to look at life realistically and not to act as if the messianic age had already arrived when the lion and the lamb might lie down together.

The Book of Proverbs does not merely present the facts of life in a neutral way. It shows its joys and its sorrows, its goodness and its badness. Consider the following:

Better is a dinner of herbs where love is
than a fatted ox and hatred with it (15: 17).
A tranquil mind gives life to the flesh,
but passion makes the bones rot (14: 30).
A gentle tongue is a tree of life,
but perverseness in it breaks the spirit (15: 4).

Such sayings picture the world with a balanced perspective, as a place where there are good motives as well as bad, and where there are friends as well as enemies. In their light the tremendous advantage of goodness over evil in conduct is made perfectly clear.

Moreover, this book elucidates the problems of life which the people of the parish face every day. To study Proverbs is to be brought into closer touch with the concrete issues which confront the members of a congregation at home and at work. It deals with children who bring grief to their parents, with youths who are only too susceptible to the temptations of life, with adults whose conduct destroys the life of a home. It warns men of the misery caused both for themselves and others by graft and greed, by short tempers and by revengeful spirits. It shows the lasting virtues and the richness of life which, by and large, belong to patient, industrious, honest folk who benefit from the lessons of experience and live with a quiet grace.

The question may be raised as to how the minister should deal with such matters from the pulpit and relate them to the central verities of faith. It is of no advantage to be brought face to face with a practical issue or a realistic observation by a verse from Proverbs if one is left floundering. But it is

2. Biblical quotations are taken from the Revised Standard Version, unless otherwise noted.

surprising how often the candid study of a maxim does lead on to a consideration of its relation to central issues of theology and to the person and work of Christ. An example may be found in the saying, "There are friends who pretend to be friends, but there is a friend who sticks closer than a brother" (18: 24). The verse suggests that there are different levels of friendship. Proverbs speaks often of friends who play at friendship. Life is full of them; they crowd around the rich but desert the poor. Genuine friendship has a different quality. "A brother helped by a brother is like a fortified city; he holds firm as the bar of a castle" (18: 19).[3] Sometimes, however, a friend may remain loyal when even brothers fail. That is the sort of friendship Charles Kingsley meant when he wrote in *The Water Babies*:

> You must expect to be beat a few times in your life, little man, if you live such a life as a man ought to live, let you be as strong and healthy as you may: and when you are you will find it a very ugly feeling. I hope that that day you may have a stout staunch friend by you who is not beat; for if you have not, you had best lie where you are, and wait for better times, as poor Tom did.

This is the characteristic of the Christian friend; he stays no matter what misfortunes befall one. But surely that sort of friendship is, most of all, the mark of Christ. He is the Great Friend who came to men in poverty and disease and affliction and in all the ugliness of life "to preach good news to the poor . . . , to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord" (Luke 4: 18 f.). It was Jesus who said, "No longer do I call you servants . . . ; but I have called you friends" (John 15: 15).

Another example may be chosen at random. According to 10: 7, "The memory of the righteous is a blessing, but the name of the wicked will rot." The appearances often seem to indicate that righteousness is of little worth. Men frequently ask why the righteous should endure, why they should give full measure and honest workmanship when no one else seems concerned about it. Proverbs insists that when the accounts are properly balanced righteousness has its value. The day will come when the wicked have no power or wealth to influence people and when people will give thanks for the lives of the righteous. John Paterson aptly phrased the thought when he wrote, "Nero may sit in his chariot as it clatters up the Capitol hill at Rome with a train of captives behind, and Paul may languish in a Roman jail, but the day does come when men are willing to call their children Paul and their dogs Nero."[4] The names of Pilate and Caiaphas have been in bad odour for 1900 years, but "how sweet the name of Jesus sounds!" In the maxim the word "blessing" translates the Hebrew *berākā*, a term which refers to the capacity or power to achieve success, to attain one's full stature and proper goal in life. The righteous are not only remembered with joy; their memory gives courage and strength to succeeding generations. The power to achieve the measure of justice and freedom experienced in modern democratic society is, in large part, the gift of many past generations who, by their patient

3. The rendering in *The Bible, An American Translation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935).

4. *The Goodly Fellowship of the Prophets* (New York: Scribners, 1948), p. 136.

conduct, inculcated high standards of righteousness and built the structure of free society. For many individuals, a hallowed memory is the inspiration which enables the person to persevere and obtain success in life. But, in a special way, the memory of Jesus is a blessing which gives the Christian the power to live abundantly.

A third example may be taken from 16: 2, "All the ways of a man are pure in his own eyes, but the Lord weighs the spirit." People are familiar with psychological attempts to discover the subconscious springs of conduct and with the tendency to excuse all misbehaviour as the effect of a mental illness or of environmental influences, rather than the action of a responsible person. Man has many ways of justifying himself. But it is God who really lays bare the inner self of a man. He probes far deeper into man's being than man himself. He knows what man's spirit or motives really are, and He also knows the cure for the deepest ailments of the human soul.

These examples show how the implications of the various sayings may be discovered by studying each separately. But it may now be asked whether there are any general principles to guide the preacher in his use of Proverbs. Such guiding principles are suggested by the introduction (1: 2–6) and the motto (1: 7) which the biblical editors added when they assembled the collections of individual sayings into the present book. They represent their understanding of the general purpose and the theological basis of the proverbs.

The introduction indicates a threefold purpose. It is set forth first in general terms (vs. 2) and then defined more fully stage by stage (vss. 3, 4, 6; vs. 5 is an interjection appended to vs. 4). The first purpose mentioned is the provision of discipline in wise conduct, and this is defined as including righteousness, justice and equity. Righteousness meant conduct in accord with recognized social and moral standards. The righteous man was in the right in his life. In a law suit he was the party acquitted by the court. Justice also had to do with social conduct. It referred to the way in which a community lived and to the treatment of its members by one another. Justice, for the Hebrew, was not pure impartiality in a legal process; it involved helping the poor and those less fortunate. Equity involved fairness and integrity in conduct. Training in these matters was effected by a process of discipline; the person who made an error, or was in danger of making an error, was corrected. Life imposes a rude discipline on men; "folly is the chastisement of fools" (16:22). Men are lazy, and they suffer want; when they are diligent they enjoy prosperity. Men become angry, and come to blows; when they speak softly they enjoy peace. Men scheme to get wealth by unjust means, and it slips away from their hands; when they earn their living they enjoy it. This discipline is described as the work of God. The wise man accepts the chastisement of God (3:11), but the fool only flies into a rage (19:3). The discipline or correction that others experience, the example of their lives and the funded experience of society may be lessons for the attentive man. Proverbs gathers up what many men have observed

and learned from the discipline of life for the guidance of others, to inculcate in them habits of righteousness, justice and equity.

The second purpose set forth in the introduction deals with the nurture of shrewdness in the simple or of knowledge and discretion in the young. The young are represented as simple, naive and gullible, ready to receive any idea that might come because they have no basis of judgment. Wisdom provided the shrewdness and discretion which were needed in order to live successfully. Shrewdness enabled a man to evaluate the motives of others and to analyze the situations in which he found himself. So Jesus told his disciples to be as cunning or shrewd as serpents, wise in the ways of the world. Discretion implies the ability to formulate plans and carry them through to completion. Wisdom, thus, equipped the youth thoroughly for the practical business of living. The parenthetical statement in vs. 5 reminds the educated adult that even he may benefit from the study of Proverbs and acquire "steersmanship." There is a great difference between book-learning and practical living, and apparently even Israel had its sages who lived in the clouds.

The third purpose of Proverbs has to do with the formal teachings of the wise men. It contains the sayings which set forth their insights into life, and it was intended to teach men to understand or discern the significance of their figures and their "riddles."

The threefold purpose of Proverbs might be summed up in the words conduct, wisdom, and knowledge. It was meant to enable a man to live socially, successfully, and sagely. It was not a book of theology but a book of morality, not a rule of faith but a rule of conduct. As such it deals with an important aspect of the Christian life which we cannot overlook. The influence of Proverbs may be seen in many of the teachings of Jesus. Paul, who always ended his letters with a section on the necessity and nature of Christian conduct, was not above quoting from Proverbs to underline his ideas.[5] It is primarily as a source book for Christian ethics that Proverbs has a significant place in the canon.

Yet the biblical editors did not think that these precepts could be divorced from theology. The motto they set down as the theme of the book was, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge; fools despise wisdom and instruction" (1:7). This is the obverse and the reverse of a single truth. On the one side, there is the religious man who fears Yahweh and acquires wisdom; on the other, there is the fool. There are a number of words for fool in Proverbs; *'ewîl* is used here, indicating a dense, stupid sort of fellow, immoral and licentious, who learns nothing from experience and on whom all blows are wasted.[6] Thus, faith and wisdom with its practical observations on life belong together, and it is faith which provides the real basis for understanding Proverbs.

Indeed, for Proverbs, there is no true knowledge apart from God. The book does mention a type of human wisdom which is man's own conceit; it writes, "Be not wise in your own eyes; fear the Lord, and turn away from

5. Cf. the quotation of 25:21 f. in Romans 12:20.

6. Cf. 27:22.

evil" (3:7; cf. 21:30). But this human intelligence was not a neutral sort of knowledge about the world or about man. It was only the wicked who thought that they could neglect God and live according to their own plans, who forgot that, though "a man's mind plans his way, . . . the Lord directs his steps" (16:9). Such knowledge is associated with wicked plans and immoral, anti-social men. The idea that intelligent men might attempt to build theories of society and social conduct on purely materialistic or humanistic science would have utterly puzzled the sages of Proverbs. The fool, interested in the success of his wicked schemes, might say, "There is no God," but the wisdom which builds up society was regarded as his gift.

Thus, for Proverbs, only the person who reverences God can gain a true education. This implies that all true science and all true morality, as well as all true religion, must start with the recognition of God. The divine Wisdom accompanied God in his work of creation and formed the pattern of the created world (8:22–31). As for man's moral nature, "The spirit of man is the lamp of the Lord, searching all his innermost parts" (20:27). His social obligations to others stem ultimately from the fact that God has made him. The basis for moral conduct and for one's treatment of other people is not social compact or psychological investigations, but reverence for God. Proverbs would not share the uncritical faith sometimes placed in unguided scientific research in more recent times. Nazi scientists "proved" that Aryans are a superior race; other psychologists claim all races have the same inherent ability. But if, to-morrow, it should be proved that all classes and races were not equal, that would not justify a change in human conduct. The basis for social conduct is not simply scientific facts, but moral compulsions and religious faith. So Proverbs says, "He who mocks the poor insults his Maker" (17:5). The New Testament would add that he denies Christ who came to redeem not only him but all men. Faith must provide the basis for race relationships and other matters of morality and set science in its true perspective.

Faith and reason, therefore, are not antagonistic in Proverbs. Faith or knowledge of God comes first, and then man's reason, humble in the knowledge of God, can understand the lessons of life and appropriate truth to itself. Indeed, man can then by reason grow in his understanding of God. A circular response is established; faith provides the basis for true wisdom, but then wisdom adds to faith. This being so, "if you cry out for insight . . . , then you will understand the fear of the Lord and find the knowledge of God" (2:3, 5). In other words, it is not merely a matter of revelation, but of discovery. The more man applies himself to wisdom, the more he learns of God, "for the Lord gives wisdom" (2:6).

It is against this background that the recurring appeals to experience must be understood. Wisdom is represented as crying out to men on the highways, at the gates of the city, in the doorways (8:1 ff.). In other words, in the places where men congregate, in the markets where they do their business, and on the roads they travel, in all their experiences Wisdom pleads with them to follow her way. They may learn if they will only attend

to her cry. An indolent man is directed, "Go to the ant, O sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise" (6:6). The teacher can relate how he looked out of his window and saw a naive youth passing through the street, describe how he was enticed by a harlot, and point out the lesson the episode held as a warning to other youths (7:6 ff.). In another passage the teacher tells how he passed by the vineyard of the sluggard with its broken wall and its nettles crowding out the vines, and from it drew a lesson: "A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to rest, and poverty will come upon you like a robber, and want like an armed man" (24:30–34). Everywhere men turn Wisdom is almost shouting at them, if they will only open their eyes and use their ears.

But can men attain wisdom so easily? Proverbs is not entirely blind to this problem. The fools and the wicked were not unknown to the sages, and sometimes they were incorrigible. "Crush a fool in a mortar with a pestle along with crushed grain, yet his folly will not depart from him" (27:22). "It is like sport to a fool to do wrong" (10:23). The hands of the sluggard "refuse to labour" (21:25).

The only solution suggested in Proverbs is to start with the very young and provide them with the proper discipline. "Folly is bound up in the heart of the child, but the rod of discipline drives it far from him" (22:15). By receiving the proper nurture the simple and the naive may be given knowledge. By and large, however, there are two classes of men, and experience has a cumulative effect upon them. The one continues to grow in folly, the other in wisdom, and the longer the process continues the more set they become in their respective ways. First, "he who heeds instruction is on the path to life, but he who rejects reproof goes astray" (10:17). Then, "a scoffer seeks wisdom in vain, but knowledge is easy for a man of understanding" (14:6). Wisdom is like a woman whose every act improves her house, but folly progressively turns hers into a ruin (14:1). Experience has a cumulative effect. Judgment is not something far off, but a progressive factor in life. Every act is a further step in the process of building up or tearing down the structure of a man's life.

The preacher must recognize that Proverbs does not give the final word. One of the great differences between Proverbs and the Gospels is that the former has no real concept of redemption, and so little expectation of conversion. The sages have no way of dealing with the man who persists in folly and will not see God. The fool who makes a sport of doing wrong remains a problem on their hands. Proverbs insists that each man is responsible for his own life as the Christian also must do, but the Christian is aware of a redemptive power which can deliver men from predicaments they are powerless to overcome alone. In Proverbs Wisdom is pictured saying of those who refuse to heed, "I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when panic strikes you" (1:26). But Jesus said, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, killing the prophets and stoning those who are sent to you! How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not!" (Matt. 23:37).

The Roman Catholic Laity of Canada

W. NELSON THOMSON

Pax Christi In Regno Christi
(Motto of Catholic Action)
"O Lord our Christ, may we have
Thy mind and Thy Spirit; make us
instruments of Thy peace . . . for
it is in giving that we receive."
(From a prayer of St. Francis of Assisi,
patron of Catholic Action)

The era of superficial, fearful, shabby Catholicism, locked in the churches and in the recesses of the heart, is over. The hour has come for the convinced, the active, the militant to take Christ into all the *milieux* in which He is not found.[1]

THE multiform activities of Catholic laymen are causing concern and alarm among Protestants, but few realize how much Roman Catholicism is counting on its lay militia in the world of today. In Canada, Catholic lay activity is taking on unprecedented proportions. There is much that we can learn from a study of the "lay apostolate" in our country. This is a general term applied to the attempt on the part of Roman Catholic laymen to catholicize every area of life. Within the general concept of the lay apostolate are included several forms of activity. *Catholic Action* (hereafter referred to as CA) may be defined as "the organization of the Catholic laity, consecrated to the apostolate in aid of, and in direct dependence on the hierarchy, in view of the triumph of the Kingdom of Christ, in individuals, in the family, and in society at large.[2] The Protestant Reformation is charged with initiating modern manifestations of Anti-Christ, and with keeping Christ out of family, school, press, government, entertainment, ethics, and literature. To quote what is to date probably the most important book on CA:

> Liberalism, child of that bloody mother, the French Revolution, and grand-child of rationalist Protestantism, broke up the framework of the Christian *civitas*, that glory of bygone days, by proclaiming religion to be but a private affair, and relieving the governments of any duty in its regard. . . . Hence the separation of state from church . . . .[3]

Before the modern era, CA had "no reason for existence."[4] In past centuries, the public powers were the "secular arm" of protection for the church, but

1. *La L.O.C. Canadienne* (Montreal: Fides, 1947), p. 278. Author's translation.
2. L. Civardi, *Manual of Catholic Action*, trans. C. C. Martindale (London: Sheed and Ward, 1935), I, p. 8.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 106–107.

present liberal society requires the effective mobilization of the laity. It is the task of CA to create the synthesis between religion and life that modern industrial society tends to make difficult. In Pius XI's encyclical *Ubi Arcano*, it is declared that the Church is to be the "mistress and guide of every other society whatever."[5] CA seeks that society should be open for development in a spiritual direction. It attempts to influence the structure of institutions which seem to reduce man to a mere cipher. It leaves to *Catholic Social Action* direct activity in the profane order. CA's activity commits the Church, because it is mandated by the hierarchy. Catholic Social Action only commits individual Catholics as such.

The Catholic, by virtue of baptism and confirmation, is a member of the mystical body of Christ, and must therefore take seriously his apostolate. St. Thomas affirms that man is at the centre of the universe, where matter and spirit intersect. On this intermediate plane, where spiritual and temporal join, "the laity is called by Catholic Action to collaborate in the apostolate of the teaching church."[6] CA has given a greater awareness of the Church to many of the faithful who formerly thought only of gaining their own salvation. They are taken up into "une action concertée sur ce qu'on nomme parfois les structures temporelles, une action catholique qui se prolonge en action sociale, voire même en action politique."[7] Theoretically, then, the Church does not meddle with temporal affairs as such.

The first task of CA is to deepen the spiritual life of its participants; to cultivate their consciences and strengthen them in the virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude. The "evangelical counsels" of poverty, chastity, and obedience, insofar as there exists no conflict with the duties of one's state in life, "constitute a program for anyone who rightly claims to be a Christian."[8] Study of the liturgy and frequent assistance at Mass are urged upon the lay "militants". "Through Mary . . . they will . . . bring God into individual souls and families and society; for she is the indispensable channel, the Mediatrix of All Grace."[9] "The first division of Catholic Action (formation) is ordered towards the second (apostolate)."[10] The Catholic layman, his faith strengthened, heeds Christ's word to Peter, "When thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren" (Lk. 22:32). His aim is then: *Omnia instaurare in Christo* (Eph. 1:10). Five things are required of CA members (1) a solid piety, (2) an exact knowledge of religion, (3) entire obedience and unlimited devotion to the pope and bishops who alone rule the church

5. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
6. J. Maritain, *True Humanism* (London: G. Bles: The Centenary Press, 1938), p. 294.
7. Roger Aubert, *La Théologie Catholique au Milieu du XX^e Siècle* (Paris: Casterman, 1954), p. 57. Author's translation: "a concerted action on what are sometimes called temporal structures, a Catholic action which extends to social action and even to political action."
8. James O'Toole, *What is Catholic Action?* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1952), p. 25.
9. Stephen Anderl and Ruth Fellman, *The Technique of the Catholic Action Cell* (La Crosse, Wisconsin: St. Rose Convent, 1950), p. 121.
10. Civardi, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

(Acts 20:28), (4) ardent and active zeal, and (5) charity towards one's neighbours.[11]

The layman is encouraged to Christianize his own *milieu*. This is defined as "the combined preoccupations, influences, customs, persons, similitude of work, which create the atmosphere and characterize the providential place where one is called to work."[12] The scope of CA, then, includes "moral conditions, industrial relations, political relations, race relations, and international relations."[13]

Each CA group has a priest as chaplain and assistant. He is considered to be a member of a working team. Exercising the authority of his office, he safeguards the group's orthodoxy and acts as moral and religious consultant. "He is the 'soul' of his association,"[14] in the sense that he helps laymen to see and undertake personal responsibility.

The story of specialized CA, as we know it today, cannot be complete without reference to Canon Joseph Cardijn of Belgium. While he was a priest in a poor industrial area, in the early years of this century, he developed a plan for reaching the working class for Christ. He organized groups of study clubs for workers, founding the *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne* (JOC) in 1912. After the first World War, the formation of the *Jocist* movement began in earnest. It gradually spread from country to country, and received the full approval of Rome in 1925.

The *Jocist* method has been applied to all the specialized CA groups, a method which "Cardijn lifted bodily from St. Thomas Aquinas,"[15] whose three steps in arriving at a wise action were Counsel, Judgement, and Command. The "inquiry method" of *Jocists* simply renames these steps Observe, Judge, and Act. Groups, following the *Jocist* technique, are organized according to age, sex, and occupation. For example, a priest desiring to initiate CA among workers or students, will select the natural leaders of the "crowd" or "gang"—those who determine "the thought, the aspirations, the entertainment, the business, the sin, and the virtue of the group."[16] Once having fired these Catholic leaders with the vision of transforming their environment insofar as it may be pagan, he forms them into a "cell." Each member of a cell is required to interest other students or workers in the project; these comprise his "team." From six to twelve is the usual membership of cells and teams, which meet weekly. Eventually teams become cells, and new recruits are thus constantly forthcoming. A "section" comprises a group of leaders (i.e., a cell), their teams and the more or less formal contacts of both on the parish level. These contacts are the "general mem-

11. A. Boulenger, *La Doctrine Catholique*, (Lyon-Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1936), II, 250 bis.
12. Joseph Charbonneau, *Catholic Action, Pastoral Letter of the Archbishop of Montreal* (Montreal: Fides, 1943).
13. John A. Ryan, *Citizen, Church and State* (New York: Paulist Press, 1941), p. 20.
14. Civardi, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
15. F. N. Wendell, *The Formation of a Lay Apostle*, (New York: The Third Order of St. Dominic, 1954), p. 87.
16. Anderl and Fellman, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

bers" of a section. A number of sections of any specialized movement in one diocese make up a "federation."

The present pope has clarified the distinct types into which CA can be divided as follows:

Action Catholique *par objet*—un mouvement d'Action Catholique visant à rechristianiser la radio, la presse, le cinéma, etc.

Action Catholique *de milieu*—nos mouvements d'Action Catholique spécialisée visant un milieu de vie.

Action Catholique *familiale*—un mouvement "structuré" sur les familles comme telles et, visant leur rénovation chrétienne.

Action Catholique *unitaire* basée sur la classification humaine, hommes, femmes, jeunes gens, jeunes filles.[17]

The last quarter century has witnessed the phenomenal growth of specialized CA, especially in "French Canada with its amazing development on the models of France and Belgium."[18] CA in French Canada, capitalizes on the concept of *milieu*; alarmed at the pragmatism and secularism accompanying the rapid development of industry, it aims at protecting Catholic culture.

Il est incontestable que la réorientation à l'époque moderne de l'apostolat de l'Eglise Catholique, selon la formule des mouvements spécialisés d'Action Catholique, signifie un effort d'adaptation à des structures sociales en voie de transformation. Alors qu'autrefois, par la paroisse, l'église rejoignait la totalité d'une communauté homogène de fidèles, il faut maintenant atteindre directement, au-delà de la frontière paroissiale, chacun des groupes professionellement différenciés et socialement mobiles, dont est constituée la société hétérogène d'une civilisation urbaine.[19]

Some of the most important specialized Canadian movements were initiated in the 1930's in French Canada: *La Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique* in 1932, *La Jeunesse Etudiante Catholique* in 1935, *La Jeunesse Agricole Catholique* in 1936, *La Jeunesse Indépendante Catholique* in 1936, and *La Ligue Ouvrière Catholique* in 1938. These movements have been nationally mandated by the assembly of Bishops. *La Ligue Ouvrière Catholique* is for

17. *Caractères Fondamentaux de la JEC Canadienne* (Montreal: Secretariat de la JEC, 1951), p. 17. Author's translation:
"Catholic Action according to *object*—a movement of Catholic Action aiming to re-Christianize radio, press, cinema, etc.
"Catholic Action according to *milieu*—movements directed to the environment (the word actually means more than this) of life.
"Catholic Action of the *family*—a movement built upon families as such and seeking their Christian renewal.
"Catholic Action by *units*—based on human classification, men, women, young men, young women."

18. John Fitzsimons and Paul McGuire, *Restoring All Things* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), p. 96.

19. Jean C. Falardeau, "Rôle et Importance de l'Eglise au Canada Français," *Esprit*, (Paris, August-September, 1952), pp. 225–226. Author's translation: "It cannot be contested that the reorientation, in the modern era, of the apostolate of the Catholic Church, according to the form of the specialized movements of Catholic Action, signifies an effort of adaptation to social structures in the process of transformation. Whilst formerly, by means of the parish, the church joined together a whole homogeneous community of the faithful, it is now necessary to reach directly, beyond the borders of the parish each of the professionally differentiated groups participating in the social flux, that make up the heterogeneous society of an urban civilization."

adults, as contrasted with the other movements which are for youth (ages 16–30). The *indépendant* movements are intended for professionals, industrialists, and functionaries; i.e. for all those who constitute the middle and leading classes of society and who enjoy a certain amount of economic and social *indépendance*.

La Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique (Young Christian Workers) has been called by Pius XI "a model for Catholic Action." Its aims are very broad: to help young workers in achieving an integrated Christian life and in applying the social teaching of the Church to their life as workers; to form a nucleus of workers who can themselves find Christian solutions to their problems, and then gradually change the mentality of their *milieu* preparatory to having these solutions accepted by the authorities. The best way to get a concrete idea of *JOCism* is to consider some of the "inquiries" or programmes of research that have taken place in French Canada in recent years: 1943–44, Workers' Housing; 1945–46, Credit and Consumers' Co-operatives; 1946–47, Family Revenue; 1949–50, Christian Social Awareness; 1952–53, Recreation in the Worker's Family. An annual week of propaganda informs the public of results of research. Conferences, forums, summer camps, savings co-operatives, rehabilitation and orientation for delinquent youth are but a few of the *Jocists'* accomplishments. In the English-speaking sections social inquiry has been directed at a study of marriage and unemployment in workers' *milieux*. Various services aimed at providing spiritual guidance are at the disposal of diocesan sections of CA movements. Literature is prepared, correspondence courses are arranged, speakers are sent to give local guidance, and secretariats are maintained. In 1941, the JOC founded, as a result of a vast research on the problems of young people, *Le Service de Préparation au Mariage*. The popular English-language periodical, *Leader*, is widely read by members of YCW; a monthly magazine, *L'Action Catholique Ouvrière*, is published jointly by JOC and LOC.

The LOC groups adults of the working class for the application of the Church's social doctrine to their problems of work and family. A triple programme—religious, social, and family—covers the interests and needs of the members. Regular study circles make observations and deductions, while periodic larger assemblies reach a greater number with their conclusions. A trained member of the organization will upon request help any family to work out a budget. In several towns and cities the LOC arranges with municipal authorities to put vacant lots at the disposal of workers for co-operative vegetable gardens. Seeds are obtained at wholesale prices. Workers' "villas" are being built in the country to provide working men and their families with a week of summer holiday at a very modest cost. Study circles for married couples discuss, often with the help of professional people, the problems of the modern home. In addition, countless services are rendered, e.g. counsel for pregnant women, supervision of playgrounds, and courses in practical skills. Popular meetings aimed at reaching the

masses, and retreats for active members are included in the programme. Housing co-operatives are established, soon to become administratively independent of LOC. Study circles are formed for unmarried women to help them to accept the Christian significance of their role. The LOC is an inspiring practical example of CA aiming at and reaching precise objects.

How is the lay apostolate coordinated? In French Canada there are many diocesan committees to promote CA. The diocesan committee is a federated body coordinating the work and promoting the growth of various movements, and serving as intermediary between the groups it represents and the larger framework of CA as nationally organized. The committee is usually mandated by the bishop for two or three years, after which period appointments may be renewed or others made. The assembly of bishops is *ex officio* in charge of CA in Canada. The Canadian Catholic Conference (CCC) with permanent secretariat in Ottawa is the annual meeting of all bishops. An episcopal commission is delegated to concern itself with CA on a national scale. In addition to episcopally-named chaplains for each specialized CA movement which has received a national mandate, there is a French-speaking chaplain for general CA. *Le Comité National d'Action Catholique* (CNAC) is the legislative organism for French Canada. As no comparable organization exists for English-speaking Catholics, it tends more or less exclusively to represent Canadian CA to public bodies and before international organizations. It promotes different forms of consultation and cooperation between national committees of the specialized movements, and the various diocesan committees. It also maintains friendly relationships with all forms of the lay apostolate. Six members of the CNAC form the executive committee, which meets twice monthly. Under the authority of this committee there is a national secretariat, the chief of which is also secretary of the executive. Thirty French dioceses are affiliated with the CNAC. A monthly mimeographed report of about 35 pages concerning Canadian and world events in CA is produced in Montreal: *Nouvelles de l'Action Catholique Canadienne.*

Most organizations of the lay apostolate maintain an international headquarters to receive reports and to act as a clearing house of information and guidance. At the first World Congress for the Apostolate of the Laity, held in Rome in 1951, national delegations came from seventy-four countries and from thirty-eight international organizations; there was also representation from seventeen ethnic groups in exile. Among the items discussed in workshops at the congress were public opinion, charity, the family, youth, the school, workers' and professional worlds, recreation, civic life, international life, migrations, artistic life, ecumenicity, and the intellectual world. As a result, the following year, the Permanent Committee for International Congresses of the Apostolate of the Laity was instituted to make further studies; to provide information; to facilitate future international congresses (the next one took place in Rome in 1957, the theme being "The Laity in the Crisis of the Modern World: Their Responsibilities and their Train-

ing"); and to act as a liaison between various international organisms. Regional meetings are frequent; e.g. the Inter-American Week of Catholic Action is a conference held every four years for sharing insights between Canada, the United States, Latin and South America.

Let us consider the lay apostolate in a few actual Canadian dioceses. In Regina, the *Jocist* "inquiry method" was formerly used, but changes have become inevitable. The YCW was developed for a factory area, heavily populated, where dire poverty produced an unChristian environment. Few of these conditions prevail in the west, and so the "Dandelion" programme, developed at Claresholme, Alberta by Father P. B. O'Byrne, was accepted for youth groups. "Dandelion" is an attempt to adapt specialized CA to ordinary youth clubs; the *milieu* concept is not emphasized. The Calgary diocese has also adopted this programme. The "cell" technique is replaced by apostolic and spiritual programmes culminating in action. Some "Dandelion" projects are: promoting a Christian Christmas with Christian displays and advertising, cleaning up side shows at fairs, improving moral effects of dances, spreading and encouraging good literature, encouraging separate schools, promoting the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, and spreading healthy attitudes on immigration and labour relations.

The Archdiocese of Montreal is heavily populated, and thoroughly organized for the lay apostolate, particularly for specialized CA. Twenty priests are engaged full time and twenty-three part time on the diocesan level. Parochial priests generally co-operate as chaplains of one or several associations. The *Ligues du Sacré-Cœur* publish and freely distribute literature aiming to improve morality; to reduce blasphemy, drunkenness, and immoral literature; and to establish family devotions. *Service de Préparation à la Vie*, begun by LICF under inspiration of the Montreal diocesan committee of CA in 1946, attempts to instruct teenagers concerning problems of adolescence and of the world they will face on leaving school. *Service d'Education Familiale* stresses instruction of parents on family problems. Study groups dependent on the *Institut Pie XI* of the University of Montreal have begun in several localities. The work of the Legion of Mary consists in visiting families (Catholic and other), visiting in hospitals and prisons, teaching the catechism, and converting heretics, including Jehovah's Witnesses. *Le Comité Saint-Paul des oeuvres de conversion interne* works towards the conversion of non-Catholics. CA is most effective in four areas—labour, family, recreation, education—proportionate effectiveness implied in order of listing. In the field of social action the following movements are at work: *La Confédération de Travailleurs Catholiques*, *L'Union des Cultivateurs*, *La Fédération Canadienne des Ecoles de Parents*, *Caisse Populaire*, and co-operatives.

In Bathurst, New Brunswick, a rather large diocese, some 3,000 adults studied social questions in the light of the papal encyclicals for a period of six months during 1954. Among the sodalities the Legion of Mary has proved to be the most effective. In general, CA affects most profoundly the

domains of family, labour and education. In some parishes complete changes have been procured: Catholic schools opened, co-operatives organized, and labour troubles resolved.

In 1927, a Catholic priest analyzed the causes of failure in the development of Canadian CA. He placed the blame upon individualism, parochialism, and nationalism. By the last he meant the division of Catholicism into various ethnic groups. While all of these problems have not been solved, CA has made great strides since that time; a call was issued for the "regional organization of Catholic forces following the main zones of the country"[20] and the "co-ordination . . . of them all, in the pursuance of a common cause."[20] In the light of the material presented above, no better summary of the method of present-day CA can be found.

What are the implications of the Catholic lay apostolate? Here it is best to let Catholic sources speak for themselves. Civardi says:

> There is a field in which all Catholics must be united religiously; that of politico-moral questions and the defense of religion. Here all sons of the church must feel the duty of solidarity, and form a compact army. Here all discord is treachery. When the supreme interests of religion and morals are at stake, party interests and *personal opinions must keep silence.* For the Salvation of souls all must be sacrificed.[21]

A Canadian Catholic writer has put the aim of the church, and therefore of CA, very clearly: "Or, pour une moitié du pays environ, la voix de l'Etat, c'est nous".[22] As another author puts it, Canadian Catholicism

> forme une entité homogène qui a tous les paliers de son organisation sociale: famille, paroisses, diocèse, pays entier, possède les plus puissants ressorts d'une action d'ensemble, s'inspire d'une doctrine solide et sure, et obéit à un mécanisme de gouvernement éprouvé par les siècles.[23]

This would perhaps cause no particular anxiety to Protestants were it not for the fact that Canon Law states (regarding civil and ecclesiastical authorities) that "the spiritual power should . . . get the preference in a conflict of jurisdiction."[24]

Our main concern, however, should be—not to sound the alarm about CA—but to call Protestant laymen to action. It is true that many social welfare and philanthropic institutions, now secular, had their origins in evangelical Christianity. Because they were not ecclesiastically controlled

20. G. T. Daly, *Catholic Action,* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1927), p. 124.
21. L. Civardi, *op. cit.,* p. 209. Italics ours.
22. Georges Simard, *Les Etats Chrétiens et l'Eglise* (Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1942), p. 175. Author's translation: "For about half of the country *we* are the voice of the state."
23. "La Situation Présente du Catholicisme au Canada," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa,* XV, (Oct.-Dec., 1945), p. 404. Author's translation: ". . . forms a homogeneous entity which at every level of its social organization: family, parishes, diocese, and the country as a whole, possesses the most powerful springs of united action, takes its inspiration from solid and certain doctrine, and obeys a system of government proven by the centuries."
24. S. Woywod, *A Practical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law,* Rev. ed., (New York: Joseph F. Wagner Inc., 1948), I, p. 2.

their Christian distinctiveness is not now explicit. But this appeal to history must not be made to acquit ourselves of responsibility.

> Just in the degree to which Protestantism had succeeded in penetrating, disciplining, moralizing the democracy, industry, technology, science, education of the Anglo-American world, it had become inextricably involved in the corresponding social and institutional structures of that world and assimilated to them. Just in the degree to which Roman Catholicism had made less contribution to the Christianizing of modern civilization, had held itself aloof, psychologically and in its institutional structure, it was in a better position to take an independent line and exert leadership in the demoralization of that civilization.[25]

The author concludes that no Protestant denomination has yet dreamed of enlisting the Church Militant in anything like the scope practised by CA. The significant difference apparently is that CA groups laymen into teams with definite purposes and goals. A small group of people with similar background effectively correlate their study and action, the latter being definitely guided by church teaching and aimed at effecting changes in the secular *milieu*. Individual activity is encouraged, but *group* effectiveness is secured through parochial activity and a concomitant awareness of participation in the church's apostolate. It is strange that Protestants, who emphasize the priesthood of all believers, are so much more prone than are many Roman Catholics to leave the important question of social action in the hands of pastors and resolution committees. It may not be too late for us to take a leaf from the Roman book.

25. J. H. Nichols, *Democracy and the Churches* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951), p. 243.

Book Reviews

Biblical Archaeology. By G. E. Wright. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1957. Pp. 288; illustrations 220; maps 8. $15.00.

Professor Wright of McCormick Seminary is a well-known Old Testament scholar. He is the editor of *The Biblical Archaeologist*, the archaeological director for the re-excavation of Balata (ancient Shechem), as well as a leading exegete and biblical theologian. Not only does Professor Wright write books; he writes useful books in a vigorous, popular style. His thoughtful interpretation of Deuteronomy as well as his challenging essay on "The Faith of Israel" in *The Interpreter's Bible* together with his stimulating *The God Who Acts* are fine contributions to biblical theology and exegesis. Together with his New Testament colleague from McCormick, Prof. F. V. Filson, he produced *The Westminster Historical Atlas to the Bible*, a work whose usefulness demanded a second, revised edition recently.

Biblical Archaeology is the most ambitious and most elegant work which Wright has as yet produced. The book is intended "to summarize the archaeological discoveries which directly illumine biblical history, in order that the Bible's setting in the ancient world and its relation to its environment may be more readily comprehended." The book is neither a biblical history nor a biblical theology, though it certainly is an aid to both, particularly to history. No one could possibly attempt to understand biblical history today without a thorough knowledge of the materials which Wright here summarizes and interprets.

Though this work is not a history as such, the author does follow a chronological pattern, progressing successively through archaeological materials which throw light on prehistoric Palestine, the Patriarchal period, the Egyptian sojourn, the conquest of Canaan, the periods of the Judges, the monarchy, the divided monarchy, the fall of Judah, the post-exilic period, the time of Christ, and the apostolic age. Exceptions to this chronological treatment occur at Chapters One, Seven and Eleven. The first chapter sets forth in popular fashion the principles and history of Biblical Archaeology. Chapter Seven is entitled "The Manner of Israel and the Manner of Canaan," and sets forth contrastively the religion of Israel and that of its Canaanite neighbours, while Chapter Eleven is an excellent discussion on "Israelite Daily Life."

The author is certainly at his best in dealing with archaeological materials and their relations to Biblical history. No significant discoveries are overlooked, and this book is the best popular but thorough presentation of this exciting subject which we now have. Since this is obviously the purpose of the book, it must be said that Wright has accomplished this in able fashion.

The maps at the back of the book are simply black and white reproductions of the well-known maps in *The Westminster Historical Atlas to the Bible*, and will be useful, though unfortunately the "Index to the Maps" in the Atlas is not included. The book also contains 220 illustrations, but these are not particularly good when compared with those in another recently published book on the biblical world: *Atlas of the Bible*, by L. H. Grollenberg, O.P., translated from the French and edited by J. M. H. Reid and H. H. Rowley (New York, Toronto: Nelson & Sons, 1956). Many of the photographs are very old, and even the more recent ones show little sense of perspective. Since it was a popular but informative book which was intended it would have been better to have concentrated on fewer but better illustrations. But this is a matter of personal taste and does not detract too much from the usefulness of the book.

Every book seems to require an introductory chapter setting forth certain principles which are to guide the reader in his perusal. Wright accordingly has written such a first chapter, but it is not a fully satisfactory one as a list of its sub-titles immediately shows. These titles are "Biblical Archaeology and Biblical Theology," "The Developing Sciences," "The 'Thunder Stones,' " "The Recovery of Lost Civilizations" and "The Development of Archaeological Method." Either this chapter promises too much or too little. If under the first heading the author intends to place his subject encyclopaedically in the theological curriculum it should be done fully and not through a superficial attempt at showing that archaeology has some relevance for biblical theology since it helps to understand biblical history. After all, it may also have relevance for problems of Hebrew and Greek grammar, of biblical introduction, exegesis and history as well. Why single out biblical theology? It is of course fashionable nowadays to mention biblical theology, but more harm than good can easily come from a cavalier use of the term.

The next three sub-sections may be taken together as dealing with the early history of biblical archaeology, but again they promise too much. Three pages of material on so large and fascinating a subject is literally worse than saying nothing at all. A few amusing instances of early misunderstandings due to lack of modern knowledge are related. But this is not only not germane to the subject, it is also not scientific. For example, Sir Walter Raleigh's reckoning that one floor of the ark could contain all the known one-hundred kinds of animals in the world must be sympathetically understood in the light of his day, not of ours. After all, wisdom will not die with us either.

The last section of the chapter deals with the gradual development of modern methods of excavation, and is as we might expect from an experienced archaeologist well-done, though one feels that at times the author presumes too much. What is obvious to Wright may not be such to the reader. For example, the nature of a *tell* and how it was formed is perfectly clear to the archaeologist, but how many laymen actually realize the layer-cake character of a Near Eastern mound, and the fact that the lower one goes the older the level?

The reviewer in all fairness must add that the strictures which he has made are intended as a tribute to his sense of the importance of the work of an author whom he respects and admires. The book is a competently and well written survey of biblical archaeology and one is only distressed that such a good book should be so costly.

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Elijah and Elisha: Expositions from the Book of Kings. By RONALD S. WALLACE. London & Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co.), 1957. Pp. xvi, 164. $3.35.

THIS BOOK should have been written differently. Reviewers are not supposed to make such statements, but there seems no alternative in this case. Wallace is the author of a fine book on Calvin,[1] and is obviously at home in Scripture. The present work is an exposition of the Elijah and Elisha cycle, roughly following the order of the Book of Kings. The stories are used to bring out lessons in faith and practice. Each story or small group of stories is the basis of a self-contained sermon.

The author states "that the task of the preacher is to proclaim the Biblical witness to Jesus Christ, and that there is a unity between the Old and New Testaments which enables us to use the Old Testament for such witness" (p. xii). Analogy is the method by which this unity can be discerned. The life of man is under the God who directed the life of historical Israel, however unworthy Israel may have been. The same, or analogous, situations exist in all ages. The stories teach morals and doctrine whatever their place in history. "Each of us can profit from the Scriptures according to our faith. . . . We need not assume that the listeners in the average congregation today are so biased against the difficult miracle stories of the Old Testament that they will refuse to allow themselves to be taught by them" (p. xi).

While much valuable and important Christian teaching is brought out, Wallace has swept aside some really fundamental difficulties. The miracles and doubtful morality of some of the Elijah-Elisha stories do cause real offence to men otherwise receptive to "teaching." The Sunday School has prepared generations of children to see Biblical characters as exclusively black or white. The dilute morality of contemporary society is inclined to be sentimental in its approach to hard judgment. Too few moderns are able to put ancient Israel and its leaders in proper perspective. Surely the preacher must help his hearers in these matters.

1. See the review by E. R. Fairweather, *The Canadian Journal of Theology*, I (1955), p. 60.

At times the author has allowed homiletic ends to dominate sound Scriptural exegesis. For example, on p. 2 Israel's relative prosperity is mentioned. On p. 128 f. the preacher finds it necessary to stress Israel's poverty, in order to heighten the dramatic contrast between Samaria and Damascus. Contrary to Wallace's statement (p. 131f.), it was not remarkable that Naaman visited a foreign healer. There is sufficient evidence that this was an accepted practice in the ancient world.[2] It is gratuitous to assume, as is done on p. 1, that Ahab expected Jezebel to give up her religion on her marriage. There is strong presumptive evidence that the religion of the northern kingdom was syncretistic long before Ahab's time. One would like to know the grounds for the statement that the ritual of Naaman's home-town religion was dull and formal (p. 130). It was more probably sensuous, even orgiastic, like that of Canaan.

The last two examples illustrate the fact that Wallace has paid insufficient attention to the place of religion in Israelite life. An even more important example is the attitude to miracle. People expected "signs and wonders" from their holy men, partly because religion and life were much more intimately connected than they are now. The real analogies between the prophets and the Christian must be drawn from the way in which their "biographies" are permeated by Israel's view of God, nature, man and society. So much study has been made of the thought patterns of the Hebrew that the preacher cannot neglect them, however much he may disagree with this or that school of interpretation. This criticism is not made purely in the interests of academic accuracy. Since religion of any kind makes too little impact on the daily existence of such a high proportion of church-goers, the enormous resources of the Old Testament need to be exploited fully. The quarrel with Wallace is not so much that he accepts literally what many believe to be legendary or apocryphal, but that he misjudges the contemporary situation.

The reviewer disagrees with the author's exegesis, finds some of his analogies far-fetched (though this may be partly a matter of taste), but is delighted to find a preacher concentrating on the Old Testament. There are many things in the book which can be used or adapted by other expositors.

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Essays on Typology. By G. W. H. Lampe and K. J. Woollcombe. London: S. C. M. (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1957. Pp. 80. $1.50.

Typology is the finding of correspondences between the events, persons and practices of the Old Testament and those of the New. The Old Testament

2. See Montgomery & Gehman, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Kings*, p. 374.

provides the type—the pattern or foreshadowing—of the New, and the New provides the antitype—the recapitulation or consummation of the Old. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the typological exegesis of Scripture held the field unchallenged, but with the advent of biblical criticism it fell into almost total discredit. Recent scholarship, however, has shown that typology was part of the mental furnishing of the New Testament writers themselves, and a number of scholars have been claiming the right to employ typological exegesis even where the New Testament writers were not aware of any typological correspondence. This book is an interesting attempt by two authors, working independently, to show what are the legitimate limits of typology.

The two authors reach the same general conclusion, though by different methods. God is Lord of history. He is faithful in all his ways and his dealings with men are bound to reveal an eternal pattern. Biblical history is the story of man's salvation, and every part of it exhibits in some measure the pattern first delineated in the Exodus and completely disclosed in the Cross and Resurrection. "If the Bible is a unity in any sense, then it is plain that it must, in some sense, be a book about Christ: and typology is simply a method of discovering and interpreting the implications of that fact" (p. 23). Thus typology is to be distinguished from allegorism which is a Greek invention, based on the Platonic dualism of the phenomenal and the real. For typology it is essential that the events compared should really have happened; but allegorical interpretation discards the husk of the literal sense once the kernel of truth has been extracted. Allegorism finds a correspondence between symbol and reality, typology between past and future.

Clearly typology is closely related to prophecy and fulfilment, and it is here that the two authors are most at variance. Dr. Lampe points out that "many events recorded in the historical books of the Old Testament, as well as the prophecies, were significant, not primarily for themselves, but for what they foreshadowed" (p. 10). But he is aware that such events frequently became the basis of a prophecy, and therefore does not try to restrict typology to those correspondences which were unforeseen by any prophet. Mr. Woollcombe, on the other hand, insists on a clear-cut distinction between typology and the fulfilment of prophecy, and castigates T. W. Manson by name (and his own colleague by implication) for using the word in a comprehensive sense. To illustrate the difference between typology and the fulfilment of prophecy he cites Matthew's treatment of John the Baptist. Matthew, we are told, describes John in terms drawn from the story of Elijah but does not, like Mark, claim that John fulfilled the prophecy of Malachi that Elijah would return before the Messiah: therefore John was not Elijah but the antitype of Elijah. This example makes the difference clear, but it is an unfortunate one, because the identification of John with Elijah which Matthew has omitted in his first description of John is found later in the Gospel (11:14) as a *verbum Christi*. The evangelists did not always take the trouble to observe the neat distinctions of the modern critic.

This book is frankly exploratory. It aims at opening up questions, not at expounding final answers. The debate will continue: and those who enter it will be the better equipped to do so when they have read these two essays.

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The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon. An Introduction and Commentary by C. F. D. Moule. Cambridge: The University Press (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited), 1957. Pp. xiv, 170. $3.60.

This slender volume represents the first in a new series to be published by Cambridge University Press as the *Cambridge Greek Testament Commentary* under the general editorship of Mr. Moule, the Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity. Dr. A. M. Ramsey had been appointed General Editor and began to assemble his team, but he found it necessary to resign on his elevation to the see of York. A great Cambridge tradition is being continued in this new series, but contrary to one's expectations it is not simply a replacement of *The Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges.* The Publishers and the General Editor have refrained from any definition of the readers at whom the volumes are aimed, and this is not very satisfactory. Are they for upper schoolboys in the Public Schools of England? are they for seminaries where students are trained for the Holy Ministry? are they for the intelligent layman, the target for much current publishing? It is the case, no doubt, in several lands that "many beyond school age . . . will welcome a commentary without Greek"; the fact is, however, that in North America a great many even in Seminaries and Colleges would actually prefer a commentary without Greek! It is true both in Britain and elsewhere that "some outside the Universities . . . will use one on the Greek text": would that all one's students and all the readers of this *Journal* could be numbered with them!

First, then, this is a commentary, in short compass but with first-class scholarship, on the Greek text of Colossians and Philemon. No continuous text is printed, and that is a pity. The omission is caused, presumably, by the high cost of printing such a text; and yet photo-offset processes might have been adopted to meet that situation. The basis of the exposition is the text of the forthcoming second edition of the British and Foreign Bible Society's Greek Testament (ed. by Prof. G. D. Kilpatrick of Oxford). This will be helpful to divinity students, for the B. and F. and allied societies provide free copies of its Greek Testament to them. Section III of the Introduction, on the textual criticism of the Pauline Epistles, has been contributed by Mr.

J. N. Sanders, Dean of Peterhouse, and it is a *multum in parvo*. From time to time the editor provides useful textual notes.

Next, the primary emphasis of this Commentary is not linguistic, textual, or historical; rather it is on the theological and religious message of the letters. Such a purpose is in keeping with contemporary trends in biblical study and is especially welcome to the sponsors of this *Journal*. Mr. Moule is well aware, of course, that the pre-requisite for theological construction and homiletical treatment is exact exegesis: hence the need for Greek in the theological curriculum. The religious concern appears, for example, on p. 47 in connection with St. Paul's prayer of thanksgiving. I am inclined to think that the primary place of thanksgiving in the apostle's prayers could have been more clearly brought out, if the commentator had put his "antecedent" praise first in the outline of the prayer's structure instead of third.

This is an important and rewarding Commentary. Notably, it is the first such exposition out of conservative Britain that shows adequate appreciation of the brilliant work of E. J. Goodspeed and John Knox on Colossians, Philemon, and Ephesians, although it does not accept all their suggestions. The possibility that the Onesimus of these Paulines is the Onesimus of Ignatius's letter to the Ephesians and thus the bishop of Ephesus is left open; "there seems to be no cogent reason" against it (p. 21). The authenticity of both letters is ably but all too briefly defended (see Ernst Percy's important book on the problem of the letters to the Colossians and the Ephesians, and Ch. Masson's commentary in French—two books used by the editor). They are both placed in Rome about A.D. 60, with the scales just tipped against Ephesus. I should concur, but I should dismiss the Ephesian Imprisonment much more forthrightly. Some note is taken of affinities between the Colossian heresy and the doctrines of the Zadokites of Qumran, and more remains to be explored in that area.

The reader will look for and will receive enlightenment on all the difficult passages in Colossians: Christ as the Firstborn, the *pleroma* of Deity, the Head of the Church; on "mystery," "glory," "knowledge," the Body of Christ. Moule takes his own line on the meaning of *stoicheia* (elementary teaching) against the current fashion (demonic powers); and his note on *sōmatikōs* (Col. 2:9) is a model. The problems of Col. 2:18, 23 are quite fully discussed. He might have considered whether the last two phrases of 2:23 are intrusive glosses. He emphasizes the new Israel concept (Col. 1:12; 3:24, entry to the promised land); baptism as a death and a resurrection, ensuing incorporation into Christ; the identification of "tradition of the facts about Christ with the believer's experience of the living Christ himself" (on Col. 2:6f. under Cullmann's influence). This difficult idea demands fuller exposition in relation to the Interpreter Spirit and the presence of the divine Word in the words of Scripture.

There is an appendix of discursive notes, e.g. on the meaning of Apostle; *Pleroma*; and the Knowledge of God. They are concise and useful. Good but critical use is made of Dibelius, Masson, Percy, J. A. T. Robinson,

Bieder, Roller, the two Scotts, Moffatt, and Seidensticker. The discerning will be sent back to J. B. Lightfoot on Colossians and Armitage Robinson on Ephesians. The Cambridge tradition abides!

I should like to commend this volume most cordially to my colleagues, and to every reader of the *Journal,* whether he has much Greek or less. We offer a warm welcome to the new *Cambridge Greek Testament Commentary* and predict an honoured place for it, if the volumes to come equal the standard set here by the distinguished Editor, whose name was long ago renowned among students of the Greek New Testament.

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Puritanism in the Period of the Great Persecution 1660–1688. By GERALD R. CRAGG. Cambridge: University Press (Toronto: the Macmillan Company of Canada), 1957. Pp. ix, 326. $5.75.

THIS VOLUME is a scholarly and discerning appraisal of English Puritanism during a period of severe adversity. The author defines the term Puritanism rather widely to include not only Independents, Presbyterians and Baptists, but Quakers as well. He has given a detailed and vivid picture of the persecutions. It was not a bright page in the history of English legal institutions. There is much evidence of brutal attacks on Puritan meetings, irregular methods in court, prejudiced judges, excessive fines, disorderly seizures of goods to pay fines and of scheming and dishonest informers.

Persecution was a time of self-examination for the Puritans. They regarded it as a result of Satan's malice but also as part of the divine plan. They were convinced that God uses suffering to bring his people to a closer knowledge of Himself. Affliction makes them "throw themselves with more complete abandon" on God (p. 73). Persecution is a means of showing whether God's people are too occupied with material things to the exclusion of a regard for Him.

The best parts of the volume are Dr. Cragg's detailed and penetrating description of the Puritan way of life and viewpoint. He gives interesting information about the Puritan Sunday, the Puritan's conscientiousness in shunning the world's frivolities, his daily devotions, meditation and prayer and the place of the household in the Puritan scheme of things. Dr. Cragg points out that critics who lay exaggerated emphasis on the individualism of the Puritan misinterpret the nature of his experience. While the Puritan was a personal follower of Christ he was also a member of the church of the living God. Dr. Cragg gives an admirable description of Puritan services of worship. He points out that their solemnity and reverence were the result of a profound belief in the majesty and holiness of God. He describes the doctrinal basis of Puritan services; their simplicity; the Puritan's suspicion of elaborate ritual; his insistence upon extempore prayer. The volume em-

phasizes the dominant place of preaching in the Puritan service. The Puritan divines preached for conversion. They sought to show man his sinfulness, his need of redemption and the fact that it was available in Christ. "Man's plight and God's succour—these were the great themes with which the Puritans were preoccupied" (p. 204).

The author has a profound admiration for the character of the Puritans. He writes (p. 85):

> Some men are brave through ignorance, some because of an excess of natural spirits, but the courage demanded by persecution (as the Puritans well knew) was of a different order. Calmly to assess the situation, and, with full awareness of the facts, to adhere to your position, presupposed fortitude of a kind that comes only from the conscious possession of adequate spiritual resources.

Dr. Cragg is admirably cognizant of Puritan literature and is well aware of the complexity of Puritan thought. He emphasizes the stress which Puritanism laid upon the sovereignty of God. The Puritan realized that God's power is over all. He met persecution assured that God's will would bring eventual deliverance, even though it might come after death.

Dr. Cragg does well to emphasize the central place of the Bible in the Puritan scheme of things. The Puritan, believing in an inspired Bible, turned to it at every season of life. Everything he did was sanctioned by the precept or example of Scripture (p. 167). After commenting on the Puritan desire to "walk close with God," Dr. Cragg writes (p. 148):

> In helping the Puritan to fulfil this aim, the reading of the Bible naturally held a pre-eminent place. . . . It was the surest weapon with which to beat off the assaults of temptation. When the pressures of persecution were severe and the courage of believers wavered, they turned to the Bible and found their faith confirmed. When problems of any kind arose, it was to the Bible that men and women looked for light and guidance.

The volume would have been strengthened by more discussion of the place of such great doctrines of the Reformed Faith as Justification by Faith, Sanctification and Election in the thinking of the English Puritans. In Chapter VIII Dr. Cragg deals with the problem of why the Puritans left the Church of England; but in the opinion of this reviewer, he does not make sufficiently clear the basic differences in doctrine between them and the high church wing of the Church of England. Since he includes Quakers under Puritanism the author might have made clearer the nature of the differences between them and the other groups more usually regarded as Puritans. In general the volume is forthright and sound. It is a welcome change after the amused condescension which sometimes passes for scholarship in modern writings on Puritanism. The author shows a sympathetic though critical insight into his subject. His book will help to produce a greater understanding of a frequently maligned people.

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The Recovery of the Holy Land. By PIERRE DUBOIS, translated with an Introduction and Notes by WALTHER I. BRANDT. New York: Columbia Univ. Press (Canada: Oxford Univ. Press), 1956. Pp. xvi, 251. $4.75.

FOR MANY years, Columbia University has published translations of selected historical documents under the general title, *Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies.* The level of scholarship has been high and indeed bids fair to continue so if Dr. Brandt's translation of Peter Dubois' *De recuperatione terrae sanctae* (written in 1306), the latest addition to the series, is any indication. Thanks to his labours, we now possess a translation, based on Langlois' critical edition of the text, which is readable and accurate, in itself no mean achievement considering Dubois' complex and involuted style. The footnotes to the text are useful and informative and, wonder of wonders, there is a carefully selected bibliography at the end, complete with critical comments, summaries and evaluations for the scholar who wishes to look deeper into Dubois and his times. Less satisfactory is the general historical introduction. There the treatment is sometimes uneven, for example, the short sketch of the evolution of the feudal monarchy in the High Middle Ages. However, such weaknesses are undoubtedly the result of trying to write an introduction which would be useful for the novice and satisfying for the specialist. The one thing the volume lacks, as in the case of its companion volumes in this series, is the text in the original. No translation can ever replace a well edited original, and it might be suggested with some cogency that the sight of the original text *with* the translation might induce a few students to exercise their high school Latin in an attempt to grapple with the original, a development devoutly to be wished. If the original text were included, there is no doubt that the *Records of Civilization* would be the equal of any comparable series of sources in translation on the continent.

What of the man and his work? As a man, Dubois deserves compassion. Born in Normandy, educated at Paris, his lifetime ambition was royal service. To gain attention, he became a publicist, vociferous in his approval of the policies of Philip IV of France. Although his career as a pamphleteer has assured Dubois of a permanent place in the history of European public opinion and in the development of propaganda as a science and art in western civilization, Dubois himself gained nothing. No significant royal office was his. *De recuperatione* and other works fell ineffective from his pen, and Dubois remained in obscurity, a middling prosperous lawyer, thwarted in his great ambitions. As for the work, *De recuperatione* is, like its author, notably lacking in distinction. Although ostensibly a plan for the conquest of Jerusalem, the pamphlet is actually a series of proposals for the reform of European society, in head and members, which reforms Dubois deemed necessary for the inauguration of a successful Christian conquest in the East. The result is a typical medieval garner of the sublime, the ignoble, the intelligent and the foolish, including trenchant criticism of the clergy and the papal curia, curiously unrealistic strategems designed to bring peace to a feudal

society within and without, reforms in the jungle of medieval legal procedure, and new projects for the study of oriental languages—to mention only a few. Some of his proposals, for example, the admission of women to the study of medicine and surgery, have led scholars to depict Dubois as a man born long before his time. Yet as Brandt points out, his ideas are to a great extent the commonplaces of the intelligentsia of his day. Nonetheless, if originality and genuine intellectual achievement cannot be claimed for Dubois, his very mediocrity, the fact that *De recuperatione* is a sampling of current European opinion, makes the man and his writings of the greatest value for anyone who wishes to understand the past history of our culture.

It is important to indicate that in Dubois the reader will find no classic statement of medieval aspirations and ideals. In this haphazard medley of opinions and exhortations, there is only a confusion born of spiritual incoherence and inconsistency. The serenity, poise and balance, the feeling for the broad design coupled with loving attention for detail which shine equally in the writings of Aquinas and in the sculptures of Chartres are not reflected in Dubois. And this is so not only because *De recuperatione* is a work of criticism. In Dubois' own lifetime, the delicate structure of medieval society had been fundamentally damaged. The characteristically medieval balance between universalism, represented by the Church, and particularism, represented by the feudal monarchy, had been upset and set awry, a process of which the infamous attack on Boniface VIII at Anagni was both the seal and the sign. Thus it is that while Dubois talked in the old terms of universal Christendom, it becomes increasingly apparent that for him the *respublica christiana* meant the universal hegemony of the French monarchy in East and West. If Anagni marked the end of the era of Papacy, under whose aegis the medieval world had achieved its most significant triumphs, it also announced the ascendancy of the modern state. Of that new Moloch, Dubois was one of the first prophets.

The cleft in the medieval mind, so visible in Dubois, may have had a deeper cause to which Dubois' writing bears indirect, yet powerful witness. It is not merely that *De recuperatione* is theologically thin beer. It is the character of Dubois' spirituality that is arresting. The older medieval spirituality had been distinguished by an almost uncanny balance between nature and supernature, by the distinction yet mutual interpenetration of reason and revelation, of law, divine and human. In Dubois' writings, we see the first symptoms of the collapse of that synthesis. This is particularly manifested in his attitude towards the Church which anticipates Occam, Marsiglio and Wycliffe: strip the Church of her temporal possessions; make the clergy (Pope included) the pensioners of the State, dispensing "piety" to the human soul; let the State rule all things temporal and material, subject to God alone—whatever that meant for Dubois. Yet whatever it meant for him, we at least know what it has meant for us in the long run: God, the Church, the sacramental life, the human soul reduced to something merely inward and private, in the end becoming "ghosts in the machine." Is there

an essential correlation between Dubois' chauvinism and this distorted spirituality? And if so, which is prior? A thoughtful appreciation of Dubois and his writing would assist any student towards a deeper understanding of the tragedy of medieval Christendom and might even serve as a kind of prolepsis into the terrible dilemmas which western Christendom has encountered since the later Middle Ages.

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Thomas Haweis, 1734–1820. By ARTHUR SKEVINGTON WOOD. Published for the Church Historical Society. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1957. Pp. 292. $10.00.

BOTH EIGHTEENTH-century Methodism and nineteenth-century Tractarianism have never lacked enthusiastic historians. Hardly a year passes without seeing the publication of studies dealing with some phase of these vital movements within the Christian Church. But for a long time the story of the rise and development of the Evangelical Party within the Established Church of England has not aroused the same interest. It is only within very recent years that this lack of balance has begun to be corrected by such writers as C. H. Smythe, Norman Sykes, and L. E. Elliott-Binns, who are taking a new, and, on the whole, a respectful look at Anglican Evangelical leaders of generations past. The volume now under review is an excellent example of this renewed interest.

Thomas Haweis—the name rhymes with *pause*—was converted through the instrumentality of the well-known Evangelical, Samuel Walker of Truro. He studied for the ministry, in part at Oxford, and eventually received ordination despite his Evangelical opinions. His licence was withdrawn because of his uncompromising preaching of those opinions and he was forced to leave Oxford for London where he was made a chaplain of the Lock Hospital. In London also he failed to commend himself to authority for promotion, but in 1764 he was inducted into the living of All Saints, Aldwincle; Northamptonshire. At his death over fifty-six years later he was still Rector of All Saints. Thus, on the one hand, Haweis was a priest of the Church, brilliant in the pulpit, faithful as a pastor in his little parish during his periods of residence. On the other hand, when in London he had become an itinerant preacher for the "avowed patroness of Evangelicalism," the Countess of Huntingdon. Even in 1791, when Lady Huntingdon died, and when her "Connection" had been in fact a dissenting body for a decade, Haweis accepted one of the four trusteeships of the estate and his wife was made a residuary legatee. His biographer writes: "Haweis seems to have undertaken the responsibility of arranging to supply the pulpits of the Connection and he himself made a regular round of the principal chapels in ensuing years." This equivocal position with regard to the Established Church helps to

explain the short shrift which he receives in standard church histories. Even in Balleine's *A History of the Evangelical Party in the Church of England* he gets merely brief and perfunctory mention. Arthur Skevington Wood states: "Of Thomas Haweis the Evangelical practically nothing has been written."

In order to remedy this neglect Dr. Wood has produced a full length biography from which Thomas Haweis emerges as a formidable personage indeed. Haweis was a voluminous writer, publishing some thirty-seven works including a commentary on Holy Scripture, a translation of the New Testament, a three-volume church history, sermons, biographies, books of devotion, hymns and hymn tunes and even a novel. On points of church history he took issue with the views of many writers including Joseph Milner. On points of theology he did not hesitate to beard the redoubtable Bishop Tomline. He was responsible for the famous voyage of the *Duff* to Tahiti under Captain James Wilson and he was the founder of the South Sea mission. He was one of the organizers of the London Missionary Society. For most of his life he was closely linked with the Countess of Huntingdon's Connection. It may be added that he was thrice married, that he started to found a family when he was sixty-eight, and that he died in his eighty-sixth year. Even Dr. Haweis' engraved portrait, depicting a bewigged, severe-looking, hawk-nosed cleric, conveys the impression of truculence and vitality.

The following crabbed remark, made late in life, illustrates the complex churchmanship of this left-wing, Evangelical, Calvinist Anglican:

> I am stigmatized as an enemy, and undermining the Establishment, and my uniform efforts are employed in keeping every gracious man I have influence with in it. The administration of the Church of England I confess abominable, and its rulers in my view the greatest enemies of the Cross of Christ, but the Church is venerable and its Articles the noblest standard of Gospel truth.

Although research on the part of Dr. Wood would undoubtedly reveal equally frank expression of their opinion of Dr. Haweis made by the Church's "rulers" yet he does not include any in his book. It is evident that the bishops found in Thomas Haweis a singularly intractable presbyter.

This work was undertaken as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh and it now appears in shortened form. It betrays its academic origin by being over-burdened with detail. It rightly defends Dr. Haweis against his detractors with some warmth, yet from time to time it pronounces judiciously critical opinions on his words and works. It lacks sympathy with the Hanoverian Church. Yet *Thomas Haweis, 1734–1820* is a thoroughly competent piece of work, informative, attractively-written, even entertaining. One is pleased to make a closer acquaintance with the composer of the noble hymn tune "Richmond," one of Haweis' more lasting legacies to the Church.

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Systematic Theology, Volume II: Existence and the Christ. By Paul Tillich. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press (University of Toronto Press), 1957. Pp. 180. $4.50.

Paul Tillich has rapidly become America's unavoidable thinker for systematic theology, as Reinhold Niebuhr is for Christian ethics. With this volume he presents the centre of his theological system, an existential restatement of Christology. This is a radical restatement, as the doctrines of the fall, sin and evil are shaped by the existential category of estrangement, while the traditional christological doctrines are dealt with according to the concept of "the New Being in Jesus as the Christ."

Originally given as Gifford lectures at Aberdeen, this volume follows the order dictated by Tillich's apologetic method, approaching the concept of revelation "from 'below,' from man in the situation of revelation, and not from 'above,' from the divine ground of revelation" (Vol. I, p. 155). Therefore he first examines "Existence and the Quest for the Christ," illustrating the "gap between man's essential and existential being," and then proceeds to "The Reality of the Christ," the way this gap is bridged by the New Being, manifested in "Jesus as the Christ."

"The Fall" is a symbol for the transition from essential to existential being, but a symbol which must be interpreted universally and not historically, as if it happened "once upon a time." Thus essential nature is a state of "dreaming innocence" which always enters into temptation as it seeks to enter existence proper, or existential being. Tillich sticks to his doctrine of a "myth of the transcendent Fall" despite Niebuhr's objection that this identifies creation and fall, relieving man of the responsibility involved in the historical interpretation—an objection too briefly answered on p. 44. The analysis of sin as estrangement now moves through three concepts, unbelief, *hubris* and concupiscence, but suffers from the lack of a definite treatment of the condemning office of the Law. In treating of "existential self-destruction and the doctrine of evil" we have Tillich's familiar "structural" approach that is so significant in cognate areas. The categorical nature of finitude (time, space, causality and substance) leads into a stimulating analysis of the tensions that demand the answer of New Being. These arise in the estranged relationship of the "ontological polarities" outlined in Volume I: freedom and destiny, dynamics and form, individualization and participation. This first half of the book closes with a helpful excursus on the nature of paradox in theology.

The second half opens with a notable summary of the problem of the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith. But this issues in a quickly sketched thesis that is the presupposition of all that follows. It seems that "theology has learned to distinguish between the empirically historical, the legendary, and the mythological elements in the biblical stories of both Testaments" (p. 108). This semantic equipment is the gift of historical research to systematic theology, "a tool for dealing with the christological symbols of the Bible." This tool, moreover (Tillich's progressive logic is not too clear

here), shows a development of the symbols through four stages, the last being "their distortion by popular superstition, supported by theological literalism and supernaturalism" (p. 109). The way systematic theology should use this tool is illustrated by his restatement of the symbols Son of Man, Messiah and Logos.

Many good things result from the revolution which Tillich proposes for Christology on the basis of his existential questions and his theological instrument—suggestions about monastic piety and the monphysitic trend throughout Church history (pp. 144f.); about the complementary nature of incarnational and adoptionist christologies (pp. 148f.); about the need for a "restitution theory" of Christ's Resurrection (p. 156); about approaching the question of universalism "on another level" (p. 167). Yet his "meaning" is still problematic. Although he warns "prospective critics of this volume" not to quibble over a new terminology, I for one must suggest that more than words are at stake. Tillich's "de-literalizing" is not convincingly enough presented as an advance over Bultmann's "demythologizing."

This systematic theology is a theology of correlation: formally, of that between existential questions and theological answers; substantially, of that between the ontological poles that are reconciled in New Being. Tillich's theology therefore moves in an elliptical manner (as he describes the "theological circle" on p. 14). He views existentialism as "the good luck of Christian theology," having helped us rediscover "the classical Christian interpretation of human existence" (p. 27). Here is the crux of the matter. His systematic theology is still apologetic and philosophical, following the exact "system" he outlined when assuming the Chair of Philosophical Theology at Union Theological Seminary (see *The Protestant Era*: 'Philosophy and Theology'). He then made it clear that "the boundary line between philosophy and theology is the center of my thought and work"; since then he has shown that ontology (as the science of "being-itself") is that philosophy which supplies the questions for theology to answer. But what if this methodology of existential questioning about being-itself distorts the anticipated answers? Then Tillich's "God beyond all gods" will represent not so much a dimension above all symbolism, as a dimension alongside and therefore outside the proper symbolism! For the unique compulsion of the Scriptural symbolism is that here is God's chosen symbolic and semantic answer. Whether Tillich's new Christology really describes and communicates that paradox which is also a scandal, Jesus Christ the Lord, remains highly problematic.

Certain minor points should be mentioned—and first the title and theme of "*the* Christ," which Walter Lowrie might be expected to attack! Calvinists will wince at the easy dismissal of the *triplex munus* as an adequate approach to Christology (p. 168), while scholars in general may deplore the cavalier fashion in which cherished battlegrounds of historical theology are sidestepped with no attempt at supplying critical references or apparatus. Canadians should read this book to understand the domestic American

debate which has led Nels Ferré to declare, "in my opinion there is no more dangerous theological leader alive than Dr. Tillich" (*Interpretation*, October, 1955, p. 466). For these reasons this is a great book, a decisive book, born of a noble desire to make theology "understanded of the people" in our time. If Paul Tillich is an unavoidable thinker, this work on "the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" is his unavoidable book.

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Kingdom and Church; *A Study in the Theology of the Reformation.* By T. F. Torrance. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co.), 1956. Pp. viii, 168. 16s.

Dr. Torrance has in recent years performed a great service to British theology in encouraging research into the theology of the Reformers and the publication of books which permit these voices from the sixteenth century to be heard once more on important issues in the life of the Church. For his own books he chooses subjects which are in the very forefront of the present theological debates. It is not long since he published a volume on Calvin's doctrine of man; in the present volume he brings the writings of Luther, Butzer and Calvin to bear on the theme of eschatology which has been so widely discussed in preparation for and in consequence of the Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches.

Unfortunately it is not Torrance's method to set his subject matter in any clear relation to such present discussions. He considers his task fulfilled if he can reproduce as exactly as possible the thought of his three Reformers, defining the relation of their eschatology to other aspects of their theology and showing where they differed from each other. No attempt is made at any point to bring the thought of four centuries ago into direct relation with the problems of eschatology as they appear in the church of today. Undoubtedly the author expects his book to contribute something to the solution of those problems but he seems to fear that the historical objectivity of his presentation might suffer if he were to admit openly that we are interested in the eschatology of the Reformers because of the urgency of the eschatological question for ourselves. The consequence is that the book has more the dry flavour of a kind of scholasticism than the sharp tang of living theological discussion between the present and the past such as one finds, for instance, in Barth's use of the literature of the Reformation.

No concessions are made to the reader even in the opening chapter to establish for him the relevance of the Reformers' doctrines for the twentieth century or to suggest to him in what ways eschatology is a subject in which he himself is inescapably involved. The author assumes that his readers are perfectly familiar with the subject of eschatology and launches with his first sentence into an involved discussion of how modern science was made

possible by the transition from medieval eschatology with its static view of nature to the more Biblical eschatology of the Reformers which left room for contingency in nature and so for the empiricism of science. Instead of leading the reader into the subject, the first chapter, both in language and content, is a hurdle to trip people up and discourage them from going on. It is safe to say that many readers will not venture beyond page 6, deciding at that point that Torrance has written not for them but for himself and anticipating the same turgid thought and expression in the whole book that they have met thus far. This will be a pity, for there is much good theological meat in the pages that follow. Nowhere else in English will one find in such small compass a comprehensive description of the part which eschatology played in the thinking of the Reformers.

The approach to Luther is much more critical than to Butzer and Calvin. In fact, one has the impression that Torrance does not find anything to criticize in either Butzer or Calvin. Lutherans might question at some points whether he has said all that is to be said for Luther. Is faith in Luther's doctrine so divorced from love and the works of love that he can be contrasted with Butzer as offering an eschatology of faith whereas in Butzer it is an eschatology of love? Or is this merely an over-simplification that provides a convenient set of titles for the three sections of the book when hope has been assigned to Calvin?

Torrance's familiar method of quoting copiously (often much more copiously than would appear necessary) from the works of the Reformers and of offering only minimal comments of his own has both strong and weak points. It lets the Reformers speak for themselves so that we meet Luther, Butzer and Calvin and not just Torrance's description and evaluation of their ideas. But the quotations seem sometimes to tumble so swiftly on to the page from the author's well-filled note-book that the line of thought development in the chapter grows weak and blurred and even threatens to swing round in a circle. On page 22 Luther's "invisible kingdom of the invisible God" is contrasted with his "revealed kingdom in which Christ as King and Lord rules through the Word of the Gospel, through the Spirit and the Sacraments." Almost at once we pass to a consideration of the contrast between this revealed kingdom (which also is invisible) and the worldly regiment which is God's way of ruling in the total community through officers of state. But on page 26 we find ourselves back at the distinction of page 22 and being introduced to it as though we had never heard of it before. The author seems to get lost at times in his own quotations.

This weakness was evident also in Torrance's earlier book on Calvin. In it the quotations concerned with God's image in man were so abundant that it took four chapters to contain them. But it was difficult to find in the four chapters four distinct divisions in the development of Calvin's thought concerning the image of God. In fact, the same themes seemed to recur in all four chapters and to give the impression of a circular motion.

There is also a pedantic quality about the book. Is it really necessary to

quote Luther in the antique German of the 16th century? And does it add anything to an English sentence to say that "it is only through *agones* and *tentationes* that the Church exists and fulfils its mission?" These mannerisms do not make for readability; nor does the constant repetition of the handy phrase "in terms of," which can usually be counted on to reduce the sentence in which it occurs to a deeper level of obscurity.

In spite of these criticisms of the form of the book, acknowledgment must be made of its value in bringing clearly to light the divergence in eschatology between Luther on the one hand and Butzer and Calvin on the other. This divergence was not only on the periphery of their thinking but at the heart of it. Luther's distinction between the invisible kingdom of Christ and the worldly kingdom in which God ruled through officers of state eventuated in a quietism which made him hesitate to draw out the full implications of the gospel for the life of man in the world. Butzer and Calvin, with their militant conception of the kingdom which in the word of the Church reaches out to claim the whole life of man for Christ, were committed to a program which could not rest until its final triumph.

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Existentialism and Religious Belief. By David E. Roberts. Edited by Roger Hazelton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. viii, 344. $5.00.

The two most influential types of contemporary philosophy are Existentialism and Logical or Philosophical Analysis. In many ways they stand at opposite poles, though they share a rejection of traditional metaphysics. The exponents of each appear to know little about each other and both would undoubtedly benefit from mutual acquaintance. Philosophical analysis sacrifices depth for clarity, while Existentialism grappling with profundities is often obscure to the point of unintelligibility.

It is just here that the present volume makes its greatest contribution. The late David Roberts, whose premature death was a great loss to Christian scholarship, had a real faculty for clear exposition which the subject of this book tested to the utmost. He presents the positions of Pascal, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel with a sympathy that is nonetheless always ready to point out errors, and with a lucidity that is rarely purchased at the price of over-simplification. He is at his best in dealing with the two most difficult of his authors, Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The notorious obscurities of the latter have, for the first time for this reviewer at least, received something approaching clarification.

No attempt is made to construct a systematic outline of Existentialism. This is, in principle, impossible since Existentialism repudiates the concept of a rational system. Instead, Roberts examines each of the philosophers in turn, going through their chief works and giving something like an orderly

sketch of their ideas. The common features emerge clearly and throw into relief the extraordinary fact of their deep religious differences: two of the six are Roman Catholics, one a Protestant, one an agnostic, and two atheists. What they share is an hostility to rationalistic philosophy and a conviction that the realities of personal selfhood, guilt, tragedy, despair, faith, hope and love, which are usually handed over by philosophers to religion and creative art, must be taken seriously by anyone who seeks the ultimate truth: "in connection with ultimate matters it is impossible to lay aside the impassioned concerns of the human individual" (p. 7). A favourite way of putting this, and a recurring theme of this book, is to say that "the whole man" and not just his reason must be involved in the philosophic quest.

It is easy to see how a philosophical starting-point of this kind can lead on to the Christian religion. Three of the thinkers in question arrive at this goal. But three do not, and it is one of the virtues of this volume that it emphasizes the potential threat to Christian faith inherent in the existentialist position; "for Kierkegaard, belief in God set limits to the scope of philosophy, but it also set limits to his own irrationalism, anti-moralism, and revulsion against conventional Christianity. Suppose these limits were removed, what then? Sartre is one answer" (p. 140). Roberts is well aware of both the strength and the weakness of Existentialism. It serves as a corrective, as a destroyer of idols, as a warning against blind alleys in Christian thought; it throws out important clues and hints for Christian apologetics and draws attention to the essential place of commitment and passion for the understanding of life. But it cannot furnish the kind of positive content that is required for a genuine world-view; for this we must look elsewhere, and perhaps in the final analysis there is only one place to look—to revelation.

This volume has been expertly prepared for publication by Roger Hazelton who has done considerable re-writing and has added indispensable introductory and concluding sections based on other writings of Roberts. The excellence of the editor's work is indicated by the absence of all trace of it in the finished production.

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Pastoral Theology: a Reorientation. By Martin Thornton. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1956. Pp. 278. $5.00.

Of books on pastoral theology there is no end. Most of them, especially on this continent, are concerned with such subjects as "How to run a church," "How to handle people's problems," "How to develop a comprehensive religious education plan for the congregation," "Integrating the church and the local community." Mr. Thornton, a Church of England clergyman,

priest of the Oratory of the Good Shepherd (presumably in London) delivers in his book *Pastoral Theology: a Reorientation* a blast against what he evidently considers this sub-Christian advice. Simply his thesis is that we need not more Christians but better Christians. With the claim that we need better Christians no one will disagree but the way in which Mr. Thornton develops his thesis will disconcert many readers. He begins by saying that the essential task of the pastor is not to teach or evangelize but to perform an ascetical function, defining ascetic as "the necessary exercise, training, and discipline demanded in the creative development of Prayer. It is but the spiritual equivalent to the effort needed to become proficient in carpentry, cricket, piano-playing, or any other human art" (p. 8). But this asceticism is never purely an individual affair. It involves a team. Christianity is essentially corporate. The problem, however, as Mr. Thornton sees it, is that not all church members are really Christian. Indeed in any congregation you will find only a small core of truly dedicated Christians. For this core he uses the biblical phrase, the "Remnant," and asserts that the minister's main business must be with this group, to train it thoroughly in ascetical discipline, giving nine-tenths of his time and energy to this task, and leaving only the remaining one-tenth for the immature Christians in his congregation and the pagans in the parish. The reason why the author can make what seems at first sight either a statement of despair or of spiritual pride goes back to his theological assumption that the Remnant is "the complete Body of Christ in microcosm, and its relation to its environment is the relation between Christ and the Twelve to their world" (p. 23); "the Remnant is the Body of Christ recapitulated in place" (p. 248).

Mr. Thornton pursues this theme consistently throughout his book, which is divided into two main parts, "Parochial Theology" and "Towards a Pastoral Ascetic," and concludes with a series of supplementary notes on such topics as "Pastoral Relations in Pastoral Practice," "Pastoral Reorganisation," "Church Finance," "The Shortage of Clergy," "Christian Unity," and "Pastoral Visitation."

He seeks to demonstrate that the Remnant approach to pastoral theology goes back to the practice of Jesus Himself in His choice of the twelve disciples, and that the history and theology of the Apostolic church also suggest the Remnant as the pastoral norm. Writing of the early church he comments, "What is glibly called missionary work in its popular sense is a true part of the Church's work; but this may be regarded as a divinely sanctioned deviation from the norm rather than the norm itself" (p. 256). As might be expected on his thesis Mr. Thornton finds values in monasticism and he has two most interesting chapters on this, which he regards as "the apostolic answer" to the tendency to liberal humanism consequent upon the establishment of the Christian faith as the religion of the Empire under Constantine. However, he is not an unqualified admirer of monasticism. "Monastic history shows a monotonously recurring cycle of reform and decline; reform tending towards other-worldly isolation, the Egyptian

flight, even escapism, thence a drawing nearer to the world which only degenerates into complete secularisation" (p. 82). He especially criticizes monasticism for its failure to be truly parochial. A truer conception of the Remnant he finds in the experiment of Gilbert, rector of Sempringham, which may have grown later into an enclosed Order but which originally began within the parish and especially within the local congregation. This conception is better fitted for modern conditions, Mr. Thornton feels. Monasticism was the form the Remnant idea may have taken in the Middle Ages, but it is not for our age. "The truth of the matter is that modern ascetic has nothing whatever to do with monks, who are amply served by Order; it is the fruit of a wholly *non*-monastic movement. Ascetical theology is the secular counterpart of monastic Order, and consequently of special import to modern laity" (p. 102).

Having established this distinction Mr. Thornton proceeds to indicate how ascetical discipline can be applied within the local congregation—in other words, how to make Christians better. He has many things of value to say in this matter. His chapter entitled "*Spiritual Health: the Holy Trinity*," with its emphasis on the comprehensive nature of Christian devotions implicit in and demanded by the doctrine of the Trinity, is particularly good. It makes clear the close relationship between worship and theology. Many of us will begin to understand why it is that our private prayers are so inadequate and unsatisfactory by a reading of this chapter. Also in his chapter on "*Private Prayer*" he has helpful and stimulating contributions to make, especially in the way in which he seeks to show that "the modern cultural ethos (is not) completely inconsistent with progressive spirituality" (p. 242). His verdicts on such modern phenomena as the monotony of much present-day work, the cinema, and noise in relation to the development or hindrance of the spiritual life are not quite what one would expect.

He concludes by laying down what he considers ought to be the devotional Rule for the true Christian, the member of the Remnant. It is threefold and consists of the following elements:

1. The Mass—Sundays and Red Letter Days or more. (He does not believe in daily Communion).

2. The Office—to be read twice daily.

3. Private Prayer—infinitely variable, but including meditation, self-examination and confession, actual recollection, and recollection in place and community.

This is, as Mr. Thornton admits, a formidable discipline, but he claims "It is the standard Rule of the English church, and if loyalty, obedience, and ascetical doctrine have any meaning at all, then no personal alternative can be substituted for it" (p. 251).

As the above outline may indicate, *Pastoral Theology: a Reorientation* raises important issues for the church. For one thing it confronts the minister with a vital reassessment of what his function truly is. Surely one of the tests of a minister's work ought to be how far he has succeeded in helping

his people to grow spiritually. If he fails here, any other successes he may have count for very little. Mr. Thornton by his emphasis on the minister as a spiritual coach, intent to develop religious athletes, reminds us of a fundamental which no minister dare ignore. Moreover it is to the credit of Mr. Thornton that he seeks to make the local congregation the spearhead of the assault by the church on the society in which it is set. "The return of religion" so devoutly to be hoped for in England as elsewhere will not come through itinerant evangelists or directives from Church headquarters, however valuable both of these may be, but through the witness of the church at prayer and at work in the parish.

There are, however, points in *Pastoral Theology: a Reorientation* which will not find a universal welcome. This reviewer was troubled throughout the reading of the book as to the basis on which any minister can decide which of his people belong to the Remnant and which do not. Indeed can any minister so divide his people into sheep and goats? Dare he? Mr. Thornton evidently believes that he can and ought, and should be prepared to give nine-tenths of his ministry to the sheep. The Remnant idea may have value but it also has great dangers. One of them is spiritual pride among the sheep and another is the disruption of the local congregation by the resentful goats!

Another disconcerting aspect of the book is a recurring denigration of preaching. Writing of conversion Mr. Thornton claims, "Neither 'teaching' nor hortatory preaching are likely to serve in bringing it about" (p. 76). Indeed he asserts that the eighteenth-century emphasis on preaching goes back to the rationalism of Descartes (p. 107). Mr. Thornton tends to equate preaching with teaching and can even draw a distinction between worship and preaching (p. 68). He has no conception of preaching as "the monstrance of Christ" nor of the essential relationship between the Word and the Sacraments. He has no theological understanding of preaching.

Allied to this weakness in grasping and expressing the significance of preaching is Mr. Thornton's attack on what he calls "multitudinism" and what others would call "the Church's mission to the world." Missionary work Mr. Thornton regards as "a divinely sanctioned deviation from the norm rather than the norm itself" (p. 256). It is no accident on this assumption that he is no admirer of the evangelical movement of the Wesleys in the eighteenth century (pp 110–111), and that he has some difficulty in accounting for the Damascus Road experience of Paul, "a startling innovation so far as the church's normal life is concerned" (p. 61). The truth seems to be that when the Remnant idea is pushed too far the Church ceases to be the Church Catholic and becomes a smug little coterie of spiritual aesthetes. Mr. Thornton would reject this interpretation but it hovers dangerously over his whole book.

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